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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the building of a sustainable business process wherein the private 
sector is integrated into the homeland security apparatus.  As the threat our nation and her 
allies face continues to evolve, so must our responses.  Integrating the private sector into 
the homeland security enterprise is long overdue.  It is conceivable the next threat will be 
uncovered by a shopping mall guard or hotel housecleaning staff which is in stark 
contradiction to the past when the intelligence community identified a foreign-based cell 
or undesirable traveler to the States ready to launch an attack.  
The private sector brings with it a plethora of talents and resources.  Because it 
has not traditionally been seen as a partner the private sector has been relegated to the 
sidelines.  This is no longer acceptable.  The FBI, in partnership with the DHS, is 
spearheading an innovative project designed to complete the circle of 360 degrees of 
protection.  Project Touchstone is an extremely successful example of a highly selective, 
small group of trusted decision makers within the private sector, primarily the security 
apparatus, meeting with the FBI and DHS wherein timely, actionable intelligence 
information is shared so soft targets can be protected and fortified.   
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This thesis discusses the building of a sustainable business process wherein the 
private sector is integrated into the homeland security apparatus as a full and trusted 
partner.  As the threat our nation and her allies face continues to evolve, so must our 
responses.  Integrating the private sector into the homeland security enterprise is long 
overdue.  The private sector brings with it a plethora of talents and resources.  But, 
because it has not traditionally been seen as a partner in securing the homeland, the 
private sector has been relegated to the sidelines.  This is no longer acceptable.  The 
nation demands perfection and has zero tolerance for failure. 
Our enemy continues to morph and evolve.  It is now a nimble, elusive, and 
disenfranchised enemy content to strike and immediately retreat into the shadows.  No 
longer is it necessary for a would-be “jihadist” to travel overseas to receive training in an 
al-Qa’ida training camp.  Instead, the disenfranchised are able to associate with the 
similar minded over the internet, read an on-line magazine, and easily hatch an attack 
plan for pennies on the dollar.  In fact, it is conceivable the next threat will be uncovered 
by a shopping mall guard or hotel housecleaning staff, which is in stark contradiction to 
the past when it was the intelligence community that identified a foreign-based cell or 
undesirable traveler to the States ready to launch an attack.   
Despite all of these changes, we continue to plug along, happy in our countering 
terrorism successes…until now.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in 
partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is spearheading an 
innovative project designed to complete the circle of 360 degrees of protection.  Project 
Touchstone in Washington, D.C. has been active for over a year.  It is an extremely 
successful example of a highly selective, small group of trusted decision makers within 
the private sector, primarily the security apparatus of the private sector, meeting with the 
FBI and DHS wherein timely, actionable intelligence information is shared in order to 
fortify otherwise soft targets.  This thesis culminates by proposing the Touchstone Project 
uniting the FBI and key private sector stakeholders is adopted throughout the U.S.   
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II. WHAT ARE WE UP AGAINST? 
A. THE CURRENT THREAT ENVIRONMENT: HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
This chapter will timeline Usama bin Laden’s rise to prominence culminating in 
the birth of al-Qa’ida.  It will discuss al-Qa’ida’s transformation and its significant 
splinter organizations.  It will further deliberate the evolution of the homegrown violent 
extremist and finally demonstrate terrorist target selection and why “soft” targets are 
preferred targets. 
B. AN AUSPICIOUS START 
The roots of al-Qa’ida took hold in the 1980s as a result of the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan.  Afghani Muslim Islamists used the Soviets’ assault as a call for 
support from Muslims around the world.  Consequently, young Muslim males from 
across the globe heeded the call and flocked to Afghanistan to engage in what they 
termed a holy war—jihad—in order to repel the super power Soviet Union from 
occupying Muslim lands.  A chief participant was none other than Usama bin Laden.1   
Bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia, the son of a wealthy construction tycoon of 
Yemeni descent.  His mother was of Syrian heritage and raised bin Laden, along with his 
two biological sisters, in the traditions of Islam.  When bin Laden was 17 years old, he 
started to become more religious.  While studying economics and public administration at 








                                                 
1 Bill Moyers, “Brief History of Al Qaeda,” Bill Moyers Journal, July 27, 2007, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07272007/alqaeda.html (accessed July 7, 2012). 
 4
extremism.  It was there that bin Laden became indoctrinated in the ways of the Muslim 
Brotherhood2 and transfixed with prominent Islamic scholars Abdullah Azzam and 
Muhammad Qutb.3   
Bin Laden became indoctrinated in the ways of Qutb, specifically the idea that 
modern societies must purify themselves of the pre-Islamic darkness or jahiliyyah.  He 
fully subscribed to the revelations of the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet.  As he 
continued to travel down the road to extremism, bin Laden understood the only way to 
accomplish the aforementioned tasks was to participate in jihad.  Bin Laden identified 
with the precepts of Qutb’s message and favored cleansing Muslim societies of the 
ignorant jahili, in particular, Western or non-Muslim influences.4    
When the superior Soviet Union invaded the downtrodden people of Afghanistan, 
bin Laden identified with their struggle and began supporting the Afghani fighters 
through all available means.  In part, bin Laden supplied the fighters with financial 
backing, trucks and other excavation equipment to assist in the construction of fighting 
positions as well as ideologically like-minded sympathizers.  It was during this time too 
that bin Laden started his anti-America rhetoric, calling for “attacks on U.S. forces and 
the boycott of American products.”5  Ultimately bin Laden’s conviction found him 
immersed in the mountains of Afghanistan standing side-by-side with his Muslim 
brothers firing American-made weapons at the evil Soviet invaders—the infidels.6  Jihad, 
                                                 
2 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1920 by Hassan al-Banna and is one of the oldest 
and biggest Islamic organizations.  The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic movement founded upon the 
desire to “spread Islamic ideals and good works… [and] rid Egypt of British colonial control and cleanse it 
of all Western influences.  ...one of its stated aims is to create a state ruled by Islamic law, or Sharia.  Its 
most famous slogan, used worldwide, is: ‘Islam is the solution.’”  BBC News, “Profile: Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood,” June 26, 2012, BBC News, Middle East, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
12313405 (accessed July 7, 2012).  
3 According to Bergen, “Azzam would go on to create the modern world’s first truly international 
jihadist network, and Muhammad Qutb…was the brother of Sayyid Qutb, author of Signposts, the key text 
of the jihadist movement.”Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden 
(New York: The Free Press; 2001), 41, 44, 47.  
4 Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 48. 
5 Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 51. 
6 From Wikipedia, “Infidel (literally “one without faith”) is a pejorative name used in certain 
religions—especially Christianity or Islam—for one who has no religious beliefs, or who doubts or rejects 
the central tenets of the particular religion.” Wikipedia, s.v. “infidel,” n.d., 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infidel (accessed July 8, 2012).  
 5
to bin Laden, was an obligation.  Importantly, bin Laden encouraged Arabs to travel  
to Afghanistan in support of their jihad culminating in a global network of fighters.  It 
was during this relative period in bin Laden’s jihadi career that he established his base—
al-Qa’ida (AQ).   
Bin Laden managed to concoct a global network of jihadi fighters that has existed 
for more than 30 years.  According to author Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda pursues its 
objectives through a network of cells, associate terrorist and guerilla groups and other 
affiliated organizations, and share expertise, transfer resources, discusses strategy and 
even conducts joint operations with some or all of them.”7  Because of its popularity, al-
Qa’ida has membership across the globe.  Significantly, some members of al-Qa’ida are 
American citizens.  Gunaratna further surmised, “Within the organization itself, the 
notion of brotherhood ingrained in Islam helps Al Qaeda cohere.”8  Whether one is born 
a Muslim or converts to Islam, al-Qa’ida instills in its members a strong appreciation of 
“their belief system and the group’s ideology, which is founded on Islamism and the 
pursuit of jihad.”9  
Al-Qa’ida’s goals for jihad, according to a document recovered from an al-Qa’ida 
safe house in Afghanistan were written as: 
 Establishing the rule of God on earth  
 Attaining martyrdom in the cause of God  
 Purification of the ranks of Islam from the elements of depravity10  
C. AL-QA’IDA TODAY 
Al-Qa’ida has evolved into a highly mobile, decentralized and extremely nimble 
organization.  Undoubtedly, core al-Qa’ida remains a threat to the United States and our 
allies because of their intentions and capabilities.  Core al-Qa’ida is assessed to have 
                                                 
7 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), 
127. 
8 Ibid., 129. 
9 Ibid.,112. 
10 Al-Qaida/Al-Qaeda (The Base), June 6, 2012, Global Security, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm (accessed August 24, 2012). 
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remained committed to attacking the U.S. in dramatic style.  However, because of 
successful collaborative efforts by members of the intelligence community—especially 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD)—
significant number of high level core al-Qa’ida leaders have been eliminated.  Most 
notably, Usama bin Laden was killed in May 2011.  Because of the elimination of key al-
Qa’ida figures, the al-Qa’ida threat has morphed into a disparate organization of like-
minded individuals acting in the name of or on behalf of al-Qa’ida.  According to the 
FBI’s Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism Division, Mark F. Giuliano: 
We are seeing an increase in the sources of terrorism, a wider array of 
terrorism targets, a greater cooperation among terrorist groups, and an 
evolution in terrorist tactics and communication methodology. The long-
term planning undertaken by senior core al Qaeda leaders which led to the 
9/11 attacks is much more difficult for them to attain in today’s 
environment. It is replaced with somewhat less sophisticated, quick-hitting 
strikes which can be just as lethal but which take less funding, fewer 
operatives, less training, and less timing to execute.11    
D. AL-QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed circa January 2009 in a 
union between two geographic-based components of al-Qa’ida in both Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen.  The Yemeni segment of AQ maintains particular significance because it is the 
ancestral home of now deceased al-Qa’ida patriarch, Usama Bin Laden.12  AQAP 
morphed into a single al-Qa’ida body for all the Arabian Peninsula, specifically 
welcoming its jihadi brethren from the defunct and ineffective AQ group in Saudi Arabia.  
According to a National Counterterrorism Center product, “AQAP’s predecessor, al-
                                                 
11 Mark F. Giuliano, “Post 9/11 FBI: The Bureau’s Response to Evolving Threats”( speech to 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Washington, 
D.C., April 14, 2011), Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-post-9-11-
fbi-the-bureaus-response-to-evolving-threats (accessed July 23, 2011). 
12 “Al-Aqaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Who Are They? Channel 4 News Looks at the al-Qaeda 
Group in the Arabian Peninsula Linked to Explosives Found on Two Cargo Planes, and Public Enemy No 1 
for the UK Intelligence Services, Anwar al-Awlaki,” Channel 4 News, October 30, 2010, 
http://www.channel4.com/news/al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-who-are-they (accessed July 23, 2011). 
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Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY), came into existence after the escape of 23 al-Qa’ida members 
from prison in the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, in February 2006.”13   
In keeping with its parental affiliation, AQAP, headquartered in Yemen, espouses 
the same ideological principles and goals as core AQ.  They trumpet the jihadist ideology 
stating violence may be used in furtherance of achieving their demands for the expulsion 
of Western troops from Islamic lands, the overthrow of pro-Western regimes within the 
Arabian Peninsula and, elsewhere, the annihilation of Israel and the re-establishment of 
the Islamic Caliphate.14  Attacks undertaken by AQAP have largely been against the 
West, especially the United States.  The group has both inspired and been responsible for 
a number of attacks.  Research conducted on behalf of the George Washington University 
Homeland Security Policy Institute concluded, “The 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing…the 
droves of AQ foreign fighters of Yemeni descent, and countless other historical 
indicators demonstrate more than a decade of Yemeni-based extremism against the 
U.S.”15  Moreover, AQAP was behind the 2008 attack on the U.S. embassy in Sana’a and 
numerous attempts to disrupt U.S. airliners.16  Most recently in May 2012, another 
AQAP plot was thwarted.  Yet again, the al-Qa’ida assemblage planned to use an  
 
 
                                                 
13 National Counterterrorism Center, “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” National 
Counterterrorism Center, n.d., http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (accessed July 23, 2011). 
14 Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Desperation or a New Life?,” 
STRATFOR Global Intelligence Weekly, January 28, 2009, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090128_al_qaeda_arabian_peninsula_desperation_or_new_life 
(accessed July 23, 2011).  
15 Frank Cilluffo and Clinton Watts, “Countering the Threat Posed by AQAP: Embrace, Don’t Chase 
Yemen’s Chaos,” Homeland Security Policy Institute Security Debrief, July 14, 2011, 
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/14/countering-the-threat-posed-by-aqap-embrace-don%E2%80%99t-
chase-yemen%E2%80%99s-chaos/ (accessed July 23, 2011).  
16 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Snapshot: Yemen Explosive Packages on Cargo Aircraft; 
November 1, 2010 in Department of Homeland Security: Explosives Discovered in Packages on Cargo 
Aircraft Bound for the Homeland,” November 1, 2010, Public Intelligence, 
http://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-dhs-snapshot-yemen-explosive-packages-on-cargo-aircraft/ (accessed 
July 23, 2011).  
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improvised explosive device to down an airliner bound for the U.S.17  This demonstrates 
AQAP’s tenacity and overwhelming desire to attack transatlantic flights bound for the 
U.S.       
Arguably, AQAP’s ability to spread its ideology makes it especially concerning to 
counterterrorism officials.  A STRATFOR Global Intelligence group assessment 
indicated, “In many ways, the ideological battlespace is more important than the physical 
battlespace in the war against jihadism, and in the jihadists’ war against the rest of the 
world.  It is far easier to kill people than it is to kill ideologies.”18  AQAP has morphed 
with the times and propagates its ideology through its media wing, al-Malahim.  Moving 
beyond fiery lectures and tapes, terrorists have leapt into the world of twenty-first century 
technology and are utilizing all forms of social networking as their new hub for spreading 
their message. In addition, they are most definitely harnessing the Web to extend their 
global reach.19  In particular, AQAP ideologue Anwar Aulaqi, an American born cleric of 
Yemeni descent, had in many ways become the Western face of AQAP.20  The MI5 
Director General described Aulaqi in a September 2010 by purporting, “His influence is 
all the wider because he preaches and teaches in the English language which makes his 
message easier to access and understand for Western audiences.”21  Anwar Aulaqi was 
killed in a drone strike in Yemen on September 30, 2011.  The same strike also claimed 
another American-born  Samir Khan.  AQAP, and Aulaqi specifically, are said to have 
also been responsible for inspiring the Carlos Bledsoe and Major Nidal Hassan shooting 
                                                 
17 Cody Curran, James Gallagher, Courtney Hughes, Paul Jarvis, Adam Kahan, Patrick Knapp, 
Matthew Lu, Jared Sorhaindo, “AEI Critical Threats: AQAP and AQAP Suspected Attacks in Yemen 
Tracker 2010, 2011 and 2012,” May 21, 2012, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/aqap-and-suspected-
aqap-attacks-yemen-tracker-2010 (accessed August 24, 2012). 
18 Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, Al Qaeda and the Tale of Two Battlespaces, STRATFOR Global 
Intelligence Weekly, October 1, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081001_al_qaeda_and_tale_two_battlespaces (accessed July 23, 2011). 
19 Evan F. Kohlmann, “A Beacon for Extremists: The Ansar al-Mujahideen Web Forum,” February 3, 
2010, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-beacon-for-extremists-
the-ansar-al-mujahideen-web-forum (accessed July 23, 2011). 
20 Topic: Anwar Al-Awlaki, The Washington Times, 2012, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/anwar-al-awlaki/ (accessed July 23, 2011). 
21 “Al-Aqaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Channel 4 News. 
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sprees.22  Both men were alleged to have been inspired by Aulaqi.  Hassan reportedly 
sought religious guidance from Aulaqi prior to his shooting rampage.23 
Khan was alleged to have been an author of AQAP’s Inspire magazine.  Both 
deaths were major blows to the terrorist group; the impacts of which are undoubtedly still 
being felt.  According to the Washington Post, “President Obama called Awlaqi’s death 
‘a major blow to al-Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate’ and described him as ‘the 
leader of external operations for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,’ or AQAP. ‘In that 
role, he took the lead in planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans,’ 
Obama said.” 24   
While the death of Aulaqi is seen as a major victory in the U.S.’s efforts to 
counter terrorism, the influence of Aulaqi cannot be discounted.  Despite his death, 
Aulaqi’s on-line presence, his recorded speeches, writings and teachings live on because 
of the internet.  The effects of his fiery anti-Western sermons will never truly be known.  
His immortality can be underscored as a side effect of the globalization of the world 
because of social media and the internet.  Notwithstanding, Aulaqi is viewed as a martyr, 
catapulting his status in the extremist Muslim world even higher.  Without a doubt, he is 
still considered the single most influential recruiter and radicalizer and especially 
dangerous because he specifically targeted an English speaking audience.    
The July 2010 publication of the on-line, English language-based AQAP 
magazine Inspire arguably changed the face of jihadists’ outreach as it is said to be 
geared toward a U.S. audience.25  The electronic reach of terrorists has become virtual, 
                                                 
22 Nitasha Tiku, “The Terrorists Are Coming From Inside the Country! American Citizens Now Our 
Biggest Threat,” New York Magazine, September 10, 2010, 
http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2010/09/american_citizens_are_now_our_biggest_threat.html (accessed July 
23, 2011). 
23 “Killing of Awlaki Is Latest in Campaign against Qaeda Leaders,” New York Times, September 30, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/30/world/middleeast/the-killing-of-anwar-al-
awlaki.html (accessed September 8, 2012). 
24 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Awlaki Hit Misses al-Qaeda Bomb Maker, Yemen Says,” Washington Post, 
October 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/anwar-al-aulaqi-us-born-cleric-linked-to-al-qaeda-
killed-yemen-says/2011/09/30/gIQAsoWO9K_story.html (accessed August 24, 2012). 
25 21st Century’s Phenomenon: Al-Qaeda New English On Line Magazine “Inspire,” Global Jihad, 
n.d., http://globaljihad.net/view_news.asp?id=1535 (accessed July 23, 2011).  
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unguarded and nearly uncensored.  This new trend is much different and more effective 
than the twentieth century flow of jihadist propaganda which was circulated largely in 
Arabic and without the help of the internet.  Conversely, “…it is increasingly second- and 
third-tier extremist social networking forums…offering dedicated English-language chat 
rooms…that appear to play pivotal roles in the indoctrination and radicalization of some 
of today’s most notorious aspiring terrorists.”26   
In testimony, Bruce Hoffman stated, “…once a group has the people’s ears and 
eyes it can manipulate their minds, causing them to act as they not might otherwise…It 
can be a vehicle for recruitment—meant to win new converts to the cause or replenish the 
ranks of depleted fighters.”27  AQAP radicalizes and recruits by playing upon common 
themes throughout their propaganda.  They are experts at preying upon disenfranchised 
youth who are seeking acceptance and a sense of belonging.  The group accomplishes 
this by overdramatizing the alleged killing of Muslims around the world at the hands of 
the Americans.  They insight anger and call upon Muslims to avenge the deaths of the 
“innocent” Muslims killed by the U.S. and her allies.28  AQAP exploited the words of 
Usama Bin Laden when he said:  
My Muslim Brothers of The World: Under the banner of the blessed 
awakening which is sweeping the Islamic world...Your brothers in 
Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help 
and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy—your enemy 
and their enemy—the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to 
do whatever you can, with one's own means and ability, to expel the 
enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam.29 
                                                 
26 Kohlmann, “A Beacon for Extremists.” 
27 Bruce Hoffman, The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists [testimony before the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence United States House of Representatives], May 4, 2006, Rand 
Corporation, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf (accessed 
July 23, 2011).   
28 Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Two Ex-Gitmo Detainees Featured in Al Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine,” 
Long War Journal, October 13, 2010, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/10/analysis_two_exgitmo.php (accessed July 23, 2011). 
29 Osama bin Laden, “The Awakenings;” Al Sahwa [blog], August 1996) 29 December 2009, http://al-
sahwa.blogspot.com/2009/12/aqap-claims-failed-midair-plot.html (accessed July 23, 2011).  
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Strategy changes are necessary and have better positioned AQAP to reach a multi-
lingual audience, appealing to their dissidence, their longing to be accepted and desire to 
belong.30  Strengthening its force is a step toward realizing AQAP’s penultimate goals.  
For instance, AQAP is currently engaged in a bloody battle over territory in Yemen.  
According to the Yemen Times, “Pitched battles are currently taking place between 
Saleh’s [the former President of Yemen] forces and armed Islamists who took control of 
Zunjubar, the capital of Abyan….”31  This is arguably AQAP’s attempt to establish an 
Islamic foothold in a key geographic area of the world.  “…forces still fight the armed 
group and claim that it is Al-Qaeda who is trying to establish their Islamic state in 
Abyan.”32 
Holding steadfast to its principles, the level of concern for AQAP has 
undoubtedly risen.  The FBI Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Mark F. Giuliano 
said, “…I believe the most serious threat to the homeland today emanates from members 
of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula….  AQAP leaders such as Anwar Aulaqi…have 
published articles on the Internet detailing their intent to strike the United States.”33  
Should AQAP continue along this path, they will likely be successful in radicalizing and 
recruiting on behalf of their cause, which will likely result in small victories.  AQAP 
remains the top priority threat group for U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  “‘AQAP 
continues to be Al Qaeda’s most active affiliate, and it continues to seek the opportunity 
to strike our homeland,’ John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism 
adviser, said…in a speech justifying how U.S. officials decide to use drone strikes to 
target suspected terrorists.”34 
                                                 
30 Kohlmann, “A Beacon for Extremists.” 
31 Ali Saeed, “AQAP, Military Fight Pitched Battles Abyan,” Yemen Times, June 8, 2011, 
http://www.yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=36179 (accessed July 23, 2011). 
32 Saeed, “AQAP, Military Fight.” 
33 Giuliano, “Post 9/11 FBI.” 
34 Azmat Khan, “Understanding Yemen’s Al Qaeda Threat,” May 29, 2012, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/al-qaeda-in-yemen/understanding-
yemens-al-qaeda-threat/ (accessed August 24, 2012). 
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E. AL-QA’IDA MERGER WITH AL-SHABAAB 
Al-Shabaab “is an armed group that grew out of other Islamist militias that have 
been battling Somalia's transitional government since 2006.  It currently controls much of 
southern Somalia—with an estimated 9,000 fighters.  It wants to impose a strict version 
of sharia [law].”35 According to al-Qa’ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, “‘I will break the 
good news to our Islamic nation, which will ... annoy the crusaders, and it is that the 
Shabab movement in Somalia has joined al-Qaeda.”  The two groups have been known to 
work together in the past; however, the official April 2012 merger is significant for a 
number of reasons.36 
Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida circa 2009 in a formal statement by 
al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, announcing their support of jihad under the 
“stewardship of bin Laden.”37  While bin Laden responded positively, he failed to fully 
support and endorse the kinship between al-Shabaab and al-Qa’ida.  It is said bin Laden 
was wary of the al-Shabaab leader’s “global jihad credentials.”  Because of his hesitance, 
bin Laden was reticent to appoint him, Godane, as the head of al-Qa’ida in East Africa 
(AQEA).  In fact, it is reported that bin Laden placed great importance on appointing 
trusted confidants to positions of power within al-Qa’ida.38 
The implications for al-Shabaab are such that they are now officially operating 
under the world-wide banner of al-Qa’ida.  With this comes fighters and support for a 
force that was seemingly losing ground as it was perceived to simply be a nationalist 
movement.  Finally, for al-Qa’ida, the impact of the union is emblematic of the problems  
 
 
                                                 
35 “Al-Qaeda and al-Shabab: Double the Trouble? We Ask What the Formal Merger of the Two 
Groups Means for the Conflict in Somalia,” Al Jazeera, February 11, 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/02/2012210174512105718.html (accessed August 
23, 2012).  
36 Ibid. 
37 Abdi Aynte, “Understanding the Al-Shabaab /Al-Qaeda ‘Merger,’” African Arguments, March 19, 
2012, http://africanarguments.org/2012/03/19/understanding-the-al-shabaabal-qaeda-
%E2%80%98merger%E2%80%99-by-abdi-aynte/ (accessed August 22, 2012). 
38 Aynte, “Understanding the Al-Shabaab /Al-Qaeda ‘Merger.’” 
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they are currently facing.  Plagued by continuous pressure from targeted drone strikes, al-
Qa’ida senior leaders have literally been on the run.  For current AQ leader Ayman al- 
Zawahiri: 
Somalia was the only country in the world, where half of its territory 
(which is the size of Texas), is under the total control of a sympathetic 
radical Islamist movement.  Even if al-Zawahiri, like Bin Laden, was 
reluctant to appoint Godane, an amateur jihadist in the standards of al-
Qaeda, to lead AQEA, the real estate under his command was a precious 
asset for global jihad.39   
Moreover: 
Over the past few years, hundreds of global jihadists from around world, 
many members of al-Qaeda, flocked into Somalia from where they’re 
operating largely unimpeded….  The country is still the best theatre of 
operations for al-Qaeda.  Nowhere in the world does al-Qaeda have such a 
large and contiguous area of activity.40   
The wedding of the two groups is indicative of the state of affairs for of core al-
Qa’ida.  It is on the ropes and is therefore accepting alliances with inferiors in order to 
stay relevant. 
To this point, emphasis has been placed on the more well-known al-Qa’ida 
groups.  This is not, however, meant to suggest there are no other threat groups to which 
attention should be paid.  Certainly, threats from Islamic extremists are and remain 
significant concerns to the U.S.’s security.   
There is tremendous unrest throughout the Middle East and other Islamic majority 
lands.  As of 2010 data, 60 percent of Muslims in Muslim-majority lands are under 30 
years of age.41  Events such as the Arab Spring have energized this disenchanted youth 
causing significant unrest throughout the region.  As a result, the lack of opportunities 
creates displaced anger.  This frustration is projected against a common enemy—namely, 
the West and, in particular, the United States—in order to justify their low station in life.  
                                                 
39 Aynte, “Understanding the Al-Shabaab /Al-Qaeda ‘Merger.’” 
40 Ibid. 
41 “Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030,” January 2011, The Pew 
Forum on Religion and Life, http://www.pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-main-
factors-age-structure.aspx (accessed September 13, 2012). 
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Consequently, countries such as Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria are becoming 
increasingly important as the threats they pose to U.S. interests is skyrocketing. 
F. HOMEGROWN VIOLENT EXTREMISTS—ENEMIES WITHIN OUR 
OWN RANKS 
Significantly, as senior al-Qa’ida leaders fade into oblivion, core AQ is becoming 
more and more decentralized.  For the U.S., this loose al-Qa’ida affiliation has 
transformed itself into homegrown violent extremism.  Homegrown violent extremists 
(HVEs) are categorized as persons inspired by those wishing to do harm, such as al-
Qa’ida.  Notwithstanding, HVEs are difficult to define as there are a number of both 
environmental and emotional factors that weigh into someone’s decision to become an 
extremist, and, secondly, to promote that extremism through violence.  Many HVEs, 
however, have similar underlying characteristics.   
For example, most HVEs have few, if any, true al-Qa’ida connections.  Many are 
lone actors, and there is no age requirement or restrictions on race or citizenship.  
Moreover, unlike in the past when an individual attempting to engage in jihad had to 
travel overseas and attend a training camp in a place like Afghanistan or the Northwest 
Frontier Province in Pakistan, today’s extremist need only log onto a computer and surf 
the Internet.  In fact, al-Qa’ida has encouraged persons interested in engaging in violence 
in support of their radical interpretation of Islam to stay at home and conduct attacks.   
HVEs have been increasingly motivated by al-Qa’ida, especially al-Qa’ida in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has exploited social media as a way of reaching large 
audiences with their messages.  To this end, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Assistant 
Director Mark F. Giuliano commented: 
First, we have seen individuals inside the United States become 
radicalized and motivated to conduct attacks against the Homeland. These 
individuals can be as diverse as U.S.-born citizens, naturalized U.S. 
citizens, foreign students, green card holders, or illegal immigrants, but the 
commonality is their desire to strike inside the United States….  Second, 
we have seen U.S. citizens become radicalized in the United States and 
travel or attempt to travel overseas to obtain training and return to the 
United States or to join and fight with groups overseas….  Lastly, we have 
seen U.S. citizens become radicalized and use the Internet to further their 
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radicalization, contribute to the radicalization of others, or provide 
services to facilitate Internet radicalization. Whereas the Internet was 
previously used to spread propaganda, it is now used in recruiting, 
radicalizing, training, and inciting terrorism. Thousands of extremist 
websites promote violence to a worldwide audience pre-disposed to the 
extremist message and more of these websites and U.S. citizens are 
involved in Internet radicalization.42 
The significance of HVEs should not be understated.  In December 2011, the 
White House published its Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.43  The FBI followed suit by 
developing its own four pronged Threat Mitigation Strategy for Combating Homegrown 
Violent Extremism.  According to the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division Assistant Director 
Mark F. Giuliano, “What makes these HVE subjects most dangerous is they 
demonstrated the willingness to take overt, operational steps as well as the ability to 
procure the materials necessary to carry out their terrorist actions. Finally, and most 
importantly, they demonstrated the resolve to act.”44  
Again, in addition to al-Qa’ida-related threats, there are a substantial number of 
non-al-Qa’ida affiliated groups that pose real challenges to homeland security.  In fact, 
concerns arise from lone offenders, who are not as easily tracked, right and left-wing 
groups such as anti-abortionists and eco-warriors and other domestic terrorist 
organizations like Sovereign Citizens, who strive to overthrow the U.S. government.  
While the threat groups may vary, each is a worry for security authorities.  Irrespective of 
their point of origin, every FBI field office is affected by some form of terrorism.  
G. SOFT TARGETS ARE EASY TARGETS 
A “soft target” lacks stringent security measures and is generally open and easily 
accessible to the public.  The private sector is largely comprised of “soft targets” making 
them especially appealing for attack by terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida and AQAP.  
                                                 
42 Giuliano, “Post 9/11 FBI.” 
43 The Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in 
the United States can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf. 
44 Giuliano, “Post 9/11 FBI.” 
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According to the Washington Post, “…The hardening of…[government and other] targets 
has increased the appeal of shopping malls, sports arenas, hotels, restaurants, bars, 
nightclubs, movie theaters, housing complexes and other ‘soft’ targets that remain 
relatively unprotected against terrorist attacks.”45  We are an open, free society devoid of 
harsh control measures.  Because of this, places we like to frequent such as the mall and 
the movie theater are vulnerable to attack. 
The influence of AQAP’s Inspire magazine further exemplifies the risk posed by 
terrorist attacks against soft targets.  This English-language propaganda continues to call 
for independent violent action against Western soft targets.  This is especially concerning 
inasmuch as individuals could be mobilized or acquire the tactical capability to conduct 
independent attacks.  For example, one edition of Inspire magazine provided detailed 
instructions on how to “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”46   
Inspire has encouraged its readers to target restaurants and cafés, military 
recruiting stations, nightclubs, highways and shopping malls.  The edition encouraged 
jihad in place further exacerbated by the statement: 
The foreign brothers that join the mujahidin, many amongst them, 
conclude that it would have been better for them to return to the West and 
launch operations. This is because killing 10 soldiers in America for 
example, is much more effective than killing 100 apostates in the Yemeni 
military.47   
Likewise, in a recent edition, the magazine provides detailed instructions on 
training with a handgun.  The explicit instructions include disassembly, proper hand grips 
and shooting stances.  This same edition provides alarmingly clear instructions on the 
assembly of a remote detonation device—written for the “average” skill level.  Perhaps 
most chilling are the demonstrative diagrams that accompany these tasks.48  
                                                 
45 Clark Kent Ervin, “Terrorism’s Soft Targets,” Washington Post, May 7, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/05/AR2006050501754.html (accessed 
July 27, 2012). 
46 AQ Chef, “How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom,” Inspire, summer 2010. 
47 “AQAP Urges US Sympathizers to Attack Malls, Nightclubs,” New Media Journal, n.d., 
http://newmediajournal.us/indx.php/item/995?sms_ss=newsvine&at_xt=4d94a71def0a6cae%2C0 (accessed 
September 8, 2012). 
48 AQ Chef, “How to Make a Bomb.” 
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It is widely known that AQ ideologues, such as American-born Adam Gadahn, 
have suggested conducting jihadist-type violent actions at home versus traveling overseas 
to engage in acts of indiscriminate violence in furtherance of their radical ideology.  
Specifically, “In Gadahn’s June 3 [2011] video, he calls on Muslims living in America to 
carry out deadly one-man terrorist acts using fully automatic weapons purchased at gun 
shows, and to target major institutions and public figures.”49  Without timely, actionable 
intelligence private sector security managers are unable to enhance security and 
strengthen their security posture. 
Time and again, terrorist groups have attacked, or planned attacks, on privately 
owned assets.  Traditionally, these events have been taken place overseas.  While there 
are too many to discuss, a couple involving American businesses or popular Western 
attractions are highlighted herein:  In 2008, the Pakistani-based militant group Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba assaulted several popular tourist attractions in Mumbai, including the Taj Mahal 
Hotel and Leopold Café, both known to be frequented by Americans and other 
Westerners.  In fact, six Americans were killed during the hours-long siege in India’s 
capital city. 50  The second was a strike on three American hotels in Amman, Jordan.  
According to an on-line source, “Suicide bombers hit 3 American hotels, Radisson, 
Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn, in Amman, Jordan, killing 57.  Al-Qaeda claimed 
responsibility.”51   
As the threat continues to evolve, so do the attacks.  As the acts of violence cross 
the sea, they become more intolerable to us as a nation.  Overseas is one thing—on ones’ 
doorstep is a game changer.  Within the last few years there have been a number of foiled 
homeland plots against unfortified locations:   
                                                 
49 Brian Ross, Rhonda Schwartz, Jason Ryan, and Richard Esposito, “Forty Names Appear on 
Terrorists’ Hit List,” ABC News, The Blotter, June 16, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/forty-names-
terrorists-hit-list/story?id=13861410 (accessed July 27, 2012).  
50 Rama Lakshmi, “Indian Police Arrest Key Suspect in 2008 Mumbai Attack Case,” Washington 
Post, June 26, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/indian-police-arrest-key-suspect-
in-mumbai-attack-case/2012/06/25/gJQAXrnG1V_story.html (accessed September 30, 2011). 
51 “Terrorist Attacks in the US or Against Americans,” 2011, 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001454.html (accessed September 30, 2011).  
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September 24, 2009 saw the arrest of Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a 19-
year old Jordanian illegal alien, who espoused his desire to conduct “self-
jihad” to an undercover agent.  The U.S. Attorney’s Office press release 
highlighted, “Smadi made clear his intention to serve as a soldier for 
Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda, and to conduct violent jihad….  The 
investigation determined Smadi was not associated with other terrorist 
organizations.”52  Smadi conducted his own pre-operational surveillance 
on the Fountain Place office tower in Dallas, Texas that he intended to 
destroy using a vehicle packed with explosives.  Smadi was arrested and 
charged with attempting to use weapons of mass destruction.53   
On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad parked his explosives-laden Nissan Pathfinder in 
the heart of Times Square in New York City and fled.  While the device seemingly 
started to ignite, it did not explode.  An astute street vendor noticed smoke and alerted 
police.  According to the New York Times:  
A large swath of Midtown—from 43rd Street to 48th Street, and from Sixth 
to Eighth Avenues—was closed for much of the evening after the 
Pathfinder was discovered just off Broadway on 45th Street.  Several 
theaters and stores, as well as the South Tower of the New York Marriott 
Marquis Hotel, were evacuated.54   
Shahzad, a 31-year old U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole having pleaded guilty to all charges.  Shahzad, 
unlike the other examples, did travel to Pakistan where he received training in explosives 
from operatives of the Pakistani militant group Tehrik-e-Taliban.  Janice K. Fedarcyk, the 
Assistant Director in Charge of the New York FBI Field Office commented:  
The case of Faisal Shahzad demonstrates the global scope of the terrorist 
threat. Distinctions between home-grown and foreign terrorists are blurred 
when a U.S. citizen travels to Pakistan to learn bomb-making from a 
known terrorist organization, then returns to the U.S. and receives 
financial backing from the overseas organization. However you define 
him, there’s no question that Shahzad built a mobile weapon of mass 
                                                 
52 Northern District of Texas, U.S. Attorney’s Office, “FBI Arrests Jordanian Citizen for Attempting 
to Bomb Skyscraper in Downtown Dallas” [press release], September 24, 2009, Dallas Division, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/dallas/press-releases/2009/dl092409.htm (accessed August 24, 
2012). 
53 Northern District of Texas, “FBI Arrests Jordanian Citizen.” 
54 Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum, “Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square,” New York Times, 
May 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/nyregion/02timessquare.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 
July 16, 2012). 
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destruction and hoped and intended that it would kill large numbers of 
innocent people—and planned to do it again two weeks later.55 
Finally, In November 2010,  “a 19 year old Somali-American attempted to 
detonate an inert device minutes before the lighting of the Portland, Oregon holiday tree 
for which he was arrested and charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass 
destruction.”56  Mohamed Osman Mohamud had attempted to travel overseas to the 
Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan to engage in violent jihad but was unsuccessful.  
Instead, Mohamud became acquainted with an undercover agent who he thought was an 
al-Qa’ida member through the Internet.  During the course of the investigation, Mohamud 
“allegedly told the FBI undercover operative that he had written articles that were 
published in Jihad Recollections, an online magazine that advocated violent jihad.”  
During the course of identifying a target, Mohamud told the undercover “that he was 
looking for a ‘huge mass that will...be attacked in their own element with their families 
celebrating the holidays.’”57 
H. SUMMARY 
From its humble beginnings in the mountains of Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida has 
become a global menace.  The threat from al-Qa’ida, its splinter and affiliated groups is 
real irrespective of whether or not the danger comes from a core member or someone 
inspired by the group’s ideology.  Al-Qa’ida has transformed itself into a belief system 
that is rousing the disenfranchised to take action against its perceived aggressors.  Some  
 
 
                                                 
55 Southern District of New York, U.S. Attorney’s Office, “Faisal Shahzad Sentenced in Manhattan 
Federal Court to Life in Prison for Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square” [press release], October 5, 
2010, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-
releases/2010/nyfo100510.htm (accessed August 24, 2012). 
56 Bryan Denson, “FBI Thwarts Terrorist Bombing Attempt at Portland Holiday Tree Lighting, 
Authorities Say,” The Oregonian, November 26, 2010, Oregon Live, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2010/11/fbi_thwarts_terrorist_bombing.html, (accessed July 
16, 2012. 
57 District of Oregon,  U.S. Attorney’s Office, “Oregon Resident Arrested in Plot to Bomb Christmas 
Tree Lighting Ceremony in Portland; Vehicle Bomb Left at Scene was Inert and Posed No Danger to 
Public” [press release], November 26, 2010, Portland Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
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of these subjugated few in the United States have become known as homegrown violent 
extremists.  HVEs are often times lone actors with few to no real al-Qa’ida connections.  
HVEs are not limited in age, race or citizenship. 
Advocates of engaging in violence are resoundingly attempting attacks on places 
that are open, easily accessible and have little to no visible security—“soft targets.”  As 
has been demonstrated both overseas and more recently in the homeland, attacks are 
against publicly accessible locales—most of which are owned and operated by the private 
sector.  Indeed a properly trained company staff member may observe pre-operational 
activity.  Whether the activity is perpetrated by an al-Qa’ida member, affiliate or inspired 
individual, a lone offender or even a disgruntled employee, prior to an attack, there is 
generally considerable planning involved. 
An informed and trained private sector will undeniably see changes in behavior of 
co-workers who may be rapidly moving along the radicalization continuum.  Too, the 
private sector will spot someone attempting to acquire the means (weapons, ammunition, 
chemicals, components, etc.) to enact an attack.  Perhaps an alert cadre will notice 
reconnaissance of attack and egress routes as suspicious or out of the ordinary activity in 
and around their place of business.  Simply, it may be the cleaning staff that stumbles 
upon propaganda materials or even attack plans in the hotel room they are in charge of 
tidying.    
Attack planning is generally complicated and comprised of a number of 
evolutions.  There are countless opportunities for a knowledgeable private sector 
employee to recognize and report terrorists’ activities prior to an attack.  For example, 
whether alone or in a cell, an attacker may have to travel to his target location.  This may 
require out of town accommodations perhaps at a hotel or motel.  Or, he may simply use 
a hotel room a command post or secure meeting place.  He needs money which may 
require business in a bank or other financial institution or the use of an ATM—some of 
which may be located within a shopping mall or grocery store.  The terrorist more often 
than not requires some means by which he can communicate with other cell members, 
terrorist leaders and financiers.  Moreover, the attack will require transportation—
whether it is for reconnaissance of the target location or travel to and from the target site.  
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Depending upon the type of attack, the perpetrator will need a place to train and rehearse 
his activities.  The training facility could be a gymnasium, martial arts studio, shooting 
range or paint-ball locale.  Lastly, the terrorist will need weapons.  The weapons may be 
firearms, ammunition, large quantities of nails, or perhaps pre-cursor chemicals.   
In the case of Najibullah Zazi, he and his family were seen purchasing inordinate 
quantities of peroxide from a local beauty supply shop.  Further, he practiced mixing 
chemicals and conducted a pre-attack test of his bomb in the parking lot of a hotel in 
which he had rented a room.58 
It becomes evident very quickly that it is nearly impossible for a terrorist planning 
an attack to not intermingle with the general public at some point during his planning 
process.  The private sector affords the logistical support necessary to carry out an 
attack—either alone or in a group.  This underscores the importance of sharing indicators, 
trends, tactics and techniques and of establishing trip wires within the private sector 
communities.  An informed and trained community is the first line of defense.  A 
radicalized individual intending to do harm will undoubtedly and in some capacity cross 
the private sector’s radar.  Establishing solid and clear lines of communication with the 
public sector is necessary to stay “left of boom.”   
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III. A QUICK REVIEW OF NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGY DOCUMENTS 
A. NATIONAL STRATEGY REVIEW 
Having established that the threat of terrorism within the U.S. is real and 
persistent, this chapter will examine the national directives and counterterrorism 
strategies and policy guidance developed since 9/11.  While a number of the documents 
called for better and more active outreach and engagement with the private sector, none 
outlined the “how to” piece of the puzzle.  For purposes of this review, government 
generated documents such as Presidential Directives, executive orders and national 
security strategies will be scrutinized.  Additionally for comparison purposes, documents 
drafted from the private sector’s point of view will be appraised. 
B. GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVES, ORDERS AND STRATEGIES 
The concept of protecting our critical infrastructure was not born post-9/11.  In 
fact, Presidential Decision Directive 63, published in 1998, “created a national goal to 
protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from international attacks.  To meet this goal, 
the directive called for a ‘public-private partnership to reduce vulnerability.’”59 
Following the catastrophic attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush signed the 
first of two significant executive orders.  On October 9, 2001, only days after the assaults 
and while the nation was still staggering from the fatal blows dealt by al-Qa’ida, the 
President signed Executive Order 13228.  This order created the Office of Homeland 
Security and the Homeland Security Council.  The offices’ mandates were to develop 
comprehensive strategies whereby the U.S. would be protected from other terrorist 
threats as well as to secure the nation’s critical infrastructure.60 
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Executive Order 13231 followed shortly thereafter on October 16, 2001.  This 
edict established the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board.  Part of the 
board’s responsibilities included outreach to and consultation with the private sector on a 
number of matters, including communication systems security.  Furthermore, the order 
established the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC).  The council, to be 
composed of 30 Chief Executive Officers, or their equivalents, from the private sector, 
academia and state and local government was charged with “responsibilities for the 
security of information infrastructure supporting the critical sectors of the economy, 
including banking and finance, transportation, energy, communications, and emergency 
government services.”61     
Reviewing the national strategy for homeland security directives published in July 
2002, October 2007, The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland published in February 2010 and, finally, the National 
Security Strategy directive of May 2010 was a fascinating journey through the 
development of a comprehensive national security strategy following the most significant 
paradigm shift in national security policy in years. All of this tedious writing and 
strategizing was brought about by the horrific terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
Each directive outlined a number of key strategies by which the President and Congress 
hoped to defend the nation against another serious attack from terrorists.   
Each piece endeavored to specifically detail the function of the newly formed 
Department of Homeland Security and highlight the need for more robust intelligence 
collection and achieving shared cooperation across the tribal, local, state and federal 
levels of government—including the incorporation of the private sector.  As with any 
major shift in thinking, some of the bold new steps have been very successful while 
others have fallen short.  Particularly interesting was the proposed strategy on Preventing 
Terrorism and Enhancing Security.  
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Not surprisingly, the first strategic goals discussed in the February 2002 report 
outlined in order of priority: “Preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; 
Reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and Minimize the damage and recover 
from attacks that do occur.”62 At this snapshot in time, only months after the attacks of 
9/11, defending the nation was described in very succinct terms—to identify, stop and 
disrupt terrorists.   
As has been seen over the years, in reality this is not as easy as it sounds.  In the 
aftermath of 9/11, the entire intelligence and federal law enforcement communities 
shifted their focus from other tasks like crime prevention and stopping the spread of 
communism to countering terrorism.  Specifically within the FBI, this meant realigning 
resources and changing a hardened criminal-focused mindset.  In 2002, the strategy 
called for a revamping of America’s intelligence community to address the lack of human 
source coverage.  This was particularly concerning for the FBI because, while there was 
tremendous source coverage in criminal matters, the FBI was not as well postured in the 
national security branch—specifically within the realm of terrorism.   
Moreover, the report highlighted an inability to exploit “foreign language 
documents.”63 The FBI was sorely lacking in its foreign language capability—a trend that 
unfortunately continues today specifically in tribal-affiliated languages and local dialects 
within countries of interest.  Lastly, the 2002 report conceptualized that “intelligence and 
information analysis is not a separate, stand-alone activity, rather an integral component 
of our Nation's overall effort to protect against and reduce our vulnerability to 
terrorism.”64  Clearly, the importance of intelligence in the war on terrorism cannot be 
overstated—the consequences can be debilitating.  
In 2002, the strategy report focused heavily on identifying the importance of 
tactical and strategic intelligence.  Tactical, actionable intelligence and analysis of the 
derived data are the cornerstones for all higher level intelligence analysis.  Without real-
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64 Ibid., 16. 
 26
time, on the ground eyes and ears, our national defense mechanisms are lost and will 
ultimately lose.  This dovetails perfectly with the requirement for human source coverage 
(HUMINT).  This tactical intelligence, sources on the ground, is at the foundation of 
developing a strong national security strategy and, more importantly, ensuring the 
execution of the strategy is working.  Important, too, is strategic analysis.  Developing a 
clear understanding of the terrorists’ radicalization, their modus operandi, goals and 
objectives will assist in providing intelligence gaps that tactical collection and analysis 
may fill.  This synthesis of information will better posture not only the FBI but also the 
whole U.S. government in combating terrorism.  Glaringly, the report speaks directly to 
tearing down the walls between Intelligence Community and law enforcement partners 
but neglects to mention the integration of the private sector into the equation. 
President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) on 
December 17, 2003.  This directive sought to elucidate roles and responsibilities related 
to the protection of critical infrastructure and key assets from terrorism.  Additionally, it 
mandated the identification, prioritization and strategy for protection of these pieces of 
critical infrastructure and key resources.  Notably, the directive specified, “Federal 
departments and agencies will work with State and local governments and the private 
sector to accomplish this objective.”65 
As the years went on, the 2007 strategy report continued to highlight the need to 
protect America against a terrorist attack.  However, instead of simply restating this task, 
it outlined tools, some new, some old (such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act—“FISA”), that could be employed by those charged with the duty of protecting 
America from a terrorist attack.  For example: 
…key legal reforms—such as the USA PATRIOT Act, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the Protect America 
Act of 2007—which promote security and help to implement both the 9/11 
Commission and the [Weapons of Mass Destruction] WMD Commission 
recommendations while protecting fundamental liberties.  Furthermore, 
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with the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the United States can 
prosecute captured terrorists for war crimes through full and fair trials.66   
Arguably, Congress and the President recognized the importance of providing 
new and innovative legal tools for law enforcement use, allowing court oversight and a 
keen understanding and protection of civil liberties.   
This report further narrowed the focus by encouraging “…the implementation of 
Intelligence-Led Policing in State, local and Tribal law enforcement….”67  While the 
message is the same—to prevent terrorism and enhance security—this report continues to 
specify tasks and tools to use to successfully succeed.  Moreover, this report highlighted 
the emergence of homegrown radicalization and the threat of terrorist’s use of weapons 
of mass destruction as real possibilities.  The report discussed the prospect of terrorists’ 
use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as a viable method of attack. 
In the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report of February 2010, the 
prevention of a terrorist event and enhancing security were two of many missions 
outlined for implementation.  Again, as the reports morph, the understanding of the 
mission becomes clearly evident as each report builds upon the next and becomes more 
specific and detailed about goals and objectives within homeland security.  For example, 
the 2010 Quadrennial Report demonstrates the need for stronger “…public-and private-
sector activities designed to counter terrorist efforts to plan and conduct attacks.”68  
Without public “buy-in,” law enforcement’s ability to have adequate human source 
coverage severely hampered.  Along with HUMINT, the report outlined the necessity of 
not only understanding the threat, but also having the personnel and expertise to analyze 
raw information into actionable, easily disseminated intelligence.   
Interestingly, the report outlined a number of great ideas and actions that should 
occur, such as deterring and disrupting operations, protecting against terrorist 
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capabilities, stopping the spread of violent extremism and engaging communities.  That 
said, the document did not offer a single idea on how to accomplish any of these 
missions, goals and objectives.69  The commentary was equally as nebulous when 
discussing the threat of WMD.  While the chronicle did offer controlling the acquisition 
and movement of raw materials and technologies—all owned by the private sector—it 
did not offer the way forward in terms of the implementation of such a plan. 
Finally, the National Security Strategy of May 2010 moved beyond the land 
borders of the United States and outlined a more global approach to national security.  
One of the “enduring national interests,” of course, was security.70  Undoubtedly, 
terrorism has no boundaries.  As a result, engaging foreign partners and developing new 
partnerships is paramount to the success of securing the homeland.  Herein, the private 
sector would certainly qualify as a new partner. 
Undoubtedly, the U.S. must remain committed to reinforcing and reinventing its 
military defenses while continuing to rely upon and engage with foreign allies.  A global 
approach to securing the borders, while seemingly counter-intuitive, may be the best use 
of limited resources.  As the report states, “…we are working with partners abroad to 
confront threats that often begin beyond our borders.  And we are developing lines of 
coordination at home across federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and 
private-sector partners, as well as individuals and communities.”71  This strategy 
effectively strengthens the U.S.’s ability to protect the homeland because of the increased 
numbers of people both at home and abroad watching for and understanding threat 
indicators and pre-operational activities.  In all, this report very succinctly and effectively 
outlines the way forward while maintaining a pragmatic approach to securing the nation.  
Unfortunately, the missing link remains a “how to” manual on incorporation of the 
private sector into the homeland security fold.   
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The NIAC Critical Infrastructure Partnership Strategic Assessment, published on 
October 14, 2008, outlines several key points regarding roles and responsibilities of both 
the government and private sector.  In part, it recognizes the importance of the private 
sector as providing essential goods and services to the nation and the world.  It also 
identified that the protection of this precious life blood is a shared responsibility between 
both parties.  As such, the report focuses on information sharing between the government 
and private sector as a critical piece in leveraging collective capabilities.  The study 
found, that while information sharing has improved, it is still woefully inadequate.  
Interestingly, the report also concluded that some corporations’ perceptions of the 
government are that it lacks understanding of private sector needs.  Other key outcomes 
included the necessity of the establishment of trusted relationships to foster the sharing of 
sometimes sensitive information and the compulsion to not get bogged-down in the 
bureaucracy of information sharing.72   
Finally, the NIAC study published in 2012 examined the current intelligence 
sharing environment with an eye on determining whether or not the right information is 
getting to the right people within the private sector.  The group acknowledged 
improvements in information sharing across the government but pinpointed shortcomings 
within the information sharing network with the private sector.  The study highlighted a 
lack of bi-directional information sharing and the ensuing gaps between collaborative 
security efforts.  Importantly, the study hit upon trust as an essential factor in a successful 
information sharing system.  Trust is highlighted as the “essential glue” to making 
partnerships work.  Furthermore, the report states:  
Trust results when partner capabilities are understood and valued, 
processes are tailored to leverage these capabilities, and these processes 
are tested and proven valuable to all partners. When breakdowns in 
information sharing occur, it erodes trust and is counterproductive to risk 
management.73   
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In short, the study found that the passage of timely, actionable and tailored 
information pertinent to the protection of critical infrastructure and key assets within the 
private sector is, more often than not, not happening.  This includes the fact that the 
private sector is not informing the government as it finds the information sharing network 
confusing and too complex.  The study also concluded that the expertise, skills, abilities 
and capabilities inherent to the private sector are not only misunderstood but not being 
leveraged in support of securing the homeland.  Finally, the review discovered that the 
Department of Homeland Security, who has the lead on outreach to the private sector, is 
failing to spearhead the cause regarding bi-directional information sharing on behalf of 
the private sector. 
C. IN CONCLUSION 
Without a doubt, the government documents underscore the importance of the 
protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources.  Indeed, not one argues 
against the inclusion of the private sector into the circle of the homeland security arena.  
However, none provides a road map for the execution of what is undoubtedly a necessary 
evolution.  Conversely, the NIAC studies point out that the private sector fully 
understands the gravity of receiving timely intelligence information.  After all, they are 
the owners and operators of the critical resources that allow America to thrive.  
Protecting these assets is not only pragmatic from a business and money-making 
perspective but an absolute.  In all, both identify the need for private sector inclusion, but 
fall short on the “how to” regarding the implementation of this great idea. 
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IV. THE FBI’S CURRENT OUTREACH FOOTPRINT 
A. EXISTING OUTREACH PROGRAMS WITHIN THE FBI 
Having shown there is a definite need for practical counterterrorism engagement 
between the U.S. government and the private sector, this chapter will detail two of the 
FBI’s many outreach programs.  A pair, InfraGard and the Domestic Security Alliance 
Council (DSAC), will be reviewed and their outreach protocols examined.  These two 
particular programs have been chosen because they most closely resemble the 
Touchstone project in Washington, D.C.  The stated objectives of each program are to 
develop relationships with private sector partners and share information.  In reality, 
neither of these programs builds the trusted relationships necessary to accomplish these 
goals. 
B. CURRENT OUTREACH 
The importance of information sharing and building alliances cannot be 
undersold.  As FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III said, “Every day, in every community, 
we are working together to stop gang activity…to root out public corruption and 
fraud…to protect our children…and to prevent terrorism.  We in the FBI know that 
information sharing is crucial to our collective success.”74  The FBI manages at least 
seven private sector outreach programs.  The FBI’s outreach footprint includes InfraGard, 
fusion centers, the Domestic Security Alliance Council, the Internet Crime Complaint 
Center, the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance, the National Gang 
Intelligence Center and the Counterintelligence Division’s Strategic Partnership 
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issues—some directly support investigative efforts while others are seen as platforms for 
“information sharing that help us to better understand emerging threats and foster crime 
prevention initiatives.”75 
C. INFRAGARD  
InfraGard was started in 1996.  Its creation was based on an identified need for 
greater investigative expertise in the areas of cyber and (post-9/11) physical security 
within the nation’s critical infrastructure.  In the Cleveland Field Office of the FBI, 
agents and subject matter experts from various private sector entities and academia untied 
forces to address these emerging threats.  With this partnership came great success—so 
much so that InfraGard was adopted as a nation-wide initiative headquartered in 
Washington, D.C.  Each of the FBI’s 56 field offices was delegated local chapter 
obligations.76   
At its heart, InfraGard is an information sharing platform between the private 
sector, the U.S. government and the FBI in particular. According to its Website, 
“InfraGard is an association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law 
enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and 
intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the United States.”77  In 1998, program 
management responsibilities for InfraGard were under the National Infrastructure 
Protection Center (NIPC).  However, after the attacks on 9/11, program management for 
NIPC was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.  Nonetheless, the FBI 
retained responsibility for InfraGard in conjunction and coordination with the DHS’s 
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InfraGard fell to the Cyber Division circa 2003.  Moreover, InfraGard attempted to 
expand its outreach to assist in counterterrorism matters as well as its cyber proficiency.78 
InfraGard’s Website states:  
The goal of InfraGard is to promote ongoing dialogue and timely 
communication between members and the FBI. InfraGard members gain 
access to information that enables them to protect their assets and in turn 
give information to government that facilitates its responsibilities to 
prevent and address terrorism and other crimes.   
The group’s objectives are many.  They include increasing the extent and 
frequency of information sharing between members and the FBI on all matters of interest 
to both the private sector and law enforcement.   
For instance, threats to critical infrastructure and key resources, identifying 
susceptibilities, ensuring interdependencies are highlighted and addressed in regard to 
safety, promoting information exchange especially as it relates to threat information, 
encouraging interaction between the private sector and all levels of government and 
finally facilitating education and training opportunities to the private sector to foster a 
better understanding of the current threats facing the nation.  InfraGard does not solely 
focus on counterterrorism issues; instead, the group takes more of an all-hazards/all-
threats approach.79  
Each FBI office appoints an InfraGard coordinator.  This person is responsible for 
recruiting and facilitating the membership process for interested persons.  Anyone can 
become an InfraGard member.  However, every individual who applies is subjected to 
database checks for quality assurance purposes.  Additionally, each pledge must sign and 
abide by Rules of Behavior.  InfraGard estimates its nation-wide membership currently 
exceeds 51,000 (including FBI personnel).80   
The benefits of being an InfraGard member are described as inclusion in a 
network of private sector contacts, privileged access to a secure FBI Web-based portal of 
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information, access to information provided by both the FBI and DHS related to critical 
infrastructure and key resources issues and concerns, and training and educational 
opportunities, finally, there is no cost to becoming an InfraGard member.81 
Notably, each InfraGard chapter is independently operated and governed by its 
own elected board of private sector associates.  It is only sponsored by the FBI—it is not 
FBI run, only affiliated.  It is this local managerial panel that sets the agenda for its 
group’s activities.  InfraGard chapters meet regularly to discuss topics of interest and may 
even invite speakers to further educate their contingencies on issues affecting their locale.  
Some may offer a newsletter, additional training and educational opportunities, and even 
“contingency plans” in the event of a failure or attack on the communication 
infrastructure.82  
Information shared through InfraGard includes items such as the DHS Daily Open 
Source Infrastructure Report.  This report “is collected each business day as a summary 
of open-source published information concerning significant critical infrastructure issues.  
Each Daily Report is divided by the critical infrastructure sectors and key assets defined 
in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.”83  Also included may be information from 
the Internet Crimes Center, the American Red Cross, incidents reported to SANS Institute 
Computer Virus Alerts and Warnings, as well as reporting from the U.S. Department of 
Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section.  Other articles and bulletins 
pertinent to the private sector are posted and accessible via the InfraGard Website: 
http://www.infragard.net. 84   
D. MISSING THE MARK 
There are some positive aspects to the all-inclusiveness of InfraGard.  Casting a 
wide net in regard to information sharing is not necessarily negative.  Indeed, the more 
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people that can be reached, the better awareness becomes—especially as it relates to 
innocuous, threat indicator-type disseminations.  This is evidenced by the DHS’s “See 
Something, Say Something” campaign that focuses on reaching the widest audience 
possible.  However, uncontrolled broadcastings of sensitive information can result in dire 
consequences if it falls into the wrong hands.   
So, while InfraGard is successful in its wide distribution of news, it misses the 
mark on a number of fronts.  For one, allowing anyone to join based on the passage of a 
simple records check causes great disparity among group members.  Its indiscriminate 
membership rolls becomes troublesome when information sharing reaches the ragged 
edges of becoming sensitive.   
For instance, an InfraGard meeting may have in its audience the chief security 
officer for Boeing Corporation who holds a top secret security clearance.  Now, sitting 
next to the Boeing executive is the owner of the local Chinese restaurant who has been in 
the United States for only 10 years.  There is a glaring difference between the two as far 
as vetting and proven trustworthiness.  Simply passing a criminal history check does not 
by any stretch indicate there should not be some measures of control placed on sensitive 
information sharing. 
Moreover, because anyone can join InfraGard, the prestige and exclusiveness of 
being a member becomes watered-down.  Furthermore, the idea of all-inclusiveness 
eliminates the ability to develop personal, trusted relationships.  To further illustrate, 
imagine Company X has 12 employees that are members of InfraGard.  The Company X 
employees decided each would take a turn attending InfraGard meetings.  If their 
InfraGard chapter hosts a meeting on a monthly basis, each Company X representative 
may only attend one InfraGard meeting per year.  Resultantly, the opportunity to get to 
know someone and develop a trusted relationship is lost.  The all-inclusiveness of 
InfraGard’s rolls may discourage decision-makers within key sectors and subsectors from 
attending InfraGard meetings or even becoming members at all.  Again, this underpins 
the inability for members to develop close, personal trusted relationships.   
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Interestingly, as well, InfraGard is an FBI sponsored not FBI controlled program.  
In fact, the FBI coordinator does not always attend InfraGard meetings.  FBI InfraGard 
coordinators are not involved in the day-to-day operations of their InfraGard groups as 
each local chapter is independently managed and sets its own agenda without the 
influence of the local FBI office.  The chapter can ask for FBI guidance or assistance, but 
beyond that, the FBI’s role is that of a facilitator.  
Additionally, information generated and disseminated through InfraGard is often 
open source materials to which everyone has access.  Beyond the convenience of having 
one portal to review, there is little value added.  The bulletins and posts are often bland, 
vague and lack timely, actionable intelligence necessary to elicit a reaction from the 
private sector.  In other words, they lack the “how does this affect my business/assets” 
pointedness desired by the private sector.   
The lackluster information, while nice to know, is arguably a result of the position 
of the InfraGard coordinators.  They are too far away from the threat—specifically the 
threat from terrorism (which is the focus of not only this thesis but also Touchstone).  In 
fact, in many FBI offices the InfraGard coordinator position is a collateral duty.   As 
such, an agent-coordinator is generally not privy to the strategic goings-on of efforts 
outside of their purview.  Therefore, they are not in a position to provide insight and 
context to published bulletins.  Because of these points, InfraGard members quickly lose 
interest in attending meetings largely because the information provided does not provide 
context or offer needed and desired guidance and insight.  Not only are coordinators 
generally removed from the counterterrorism threat, as previously stated, they rarely 
direct the activities of their local chapter. 
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E. THE DOMESTIC SECURITY ALLIANCE COUNCIL 
DSAC was created in 2005 as a domestic-based organization modeled after the 
U.S. Department of State’s Overseas Security Advisory Council.85  The council evolved 
out of a need for information.  Chief security officers representing businesses crossing all 
sectors and subsectors called upon the FBI to bridge the gap with the private sector and 
threat information.86  DSAC is described as: 
a strategic partnership between the FBI, the Department of Homeland 
Security and the private sector, [that] enhances communications and 
promotes the timely and bidirectional effective exchange of information 
keeping the nation's critical infrastructure safe, secure and resilient. DSAC 
advances elements of the FBI and DHS missions' in preventing, deterring, 
and investigating criminal and terrorism acts, particularly those effecting 
interstate commerce, while advancing the ability of the U.S. private sector 
to protect its employees, assets and proprietary information.87   
Membership to the council is more selective than that of InfraGard.  DSAC 
operates at the corporate or executive level.  It is open to companies that have distinct 
security departments with a managing corporate-level security officer, or its equivalent, 
responsible for the company’s overall security and intelligence requirements.  Most 
participants represent Global 1000 companies or “maintain one billion dollars in annual 
revenue and possess an organized…intelligence component….”88  Reporting indicates 
that as of 2010, membership included a representative from every sector and subsector.  
Additionally, “companies participating in DSAC account for approximately 34% of the 
U.S. Gross Domestic Product, and account for 8.1% of total U.S. employment.”89 
Preferably, requests for DSAC affiliation are handled via a nomination from a 
current affiliate or the resident FBI office.  However, companies may nominate 
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themselves, which requires the corporation undergo a vetting process.  Additionally, all 
participants are required to acknowledge and abide by rules of conduct which outline 
roles, responsibilities and expectations.  An organization’s DSAC primary point of 
contact is their corporate security officer.  This does not, however, eliminate others from 
within the company access to DSAC publications, bulletins and portals.  Analytical 
cadres within the private sector are encouraged to seek access to the same.90   
Association benefits include access to security information provided by all 
government entities with a role in homeland security, outreach to a diverse group of 
security experts from across the government and private sector, semi-annual training at 
the Domestic Security Executive Academy for Chief Security Officers and intelligence 
analyst professional development training through quarterly symposiums as well as 
opportunities for participation in DSAC special committees.91 
Another service offered by DSAC is the Leadership Board which is a collection 
of about 25 envoys from a cross section of sectors and subsectors.   The Leadership 
Board acts as the subject matter experts for their relevant businesses.  Table 1 contains 








                                                 
90 The Domestic Security Alliance Council, “Domestic Security Alliance Council,” n.d., 
http://www.dsac.gov/Pages/join.aspx (accessed August 27, 2012). 
91 Domestic Security Alliance Council, “Enhancing Security for American Businesses,” 3. 
92 Domestic Security Alliance Council, “DSAC Leadership Board,” n.d. 
http://www.dsac.gov/Pages/dlb.aspx (accessed July 28, 2012). 
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Table 1.   Current DSAC Leadership Board Members 
3M Archer Daniels Midland 
American Express Bank of America 
Barclays Boeing 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Bridgestone Firestone 
CIGNA Citigroup 
Coca-Cola  ConocoPhillips 
Ernst & Young FedEx Corp 
DuPont General Electric 
Kellogg's KMPG International 
JetBlue MasterCard 
Medco Health Solutions Merck & Company 
NextEra Energy RBS/Citizens 
USAA Walmart 
Walt Disney Company Time Warner 
United Airlines 
 
Finally, DSAC offers yearly instruction for both corporate security officers and 
the intelligence analyst cadre.  For the security corps, the Domestic Security Executive 
Academy (DSEA) is a week-long training session offered bi-annually and in coordination 
with the DHS, FBI Academy and the Leadership Development Institute.  This 
instructional session includes approximately 25 private sector chief security officers from 
various Fortune 1000 companies, about five federal law enforcement partners and 
roughly 10 FBI Special Agents in Charge from various field offices.  The conference 
offers guidance on information sharing and affords participants the opportunity to mingle 
and develop professional relationships.93 
The Intelligence Analyst Symposium (IAS) is a two and a half day FBI 
Headquarters-based course offered to private sector intelligence and security analysts, 
federal law enforcement partners and FBI and DHS field intelligence analysts.  The 
                                                 
93 Domestic Security Alliance Council, “DSAC Leadership Board.” 
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program is designed to highlight “collecting and sharing information on domestic 
criminal threats” to “people, property and [have the potential to] disrupt the normal flow 
of commerce in the United States.”94  Each IAS assembly is comprised of approximately 
40 total intelligence staff from various Fortune 1000 companies, FBI Field Intelligence 
Groups (FIGs) and fusion centers.  The curriculum includes discussion about analytical 
approaches, best practices, small group exercises, understanding tradecraft and offers an 
opportunity to develop relationships.  A focus of both conferences is to encourage 
“greater collaboration and cooperation.”95 
E. DSAC: GOOD, BUT NOT GREAT 
DSAC is perfectly postured to have a tremendous impact on information sharing 
and true collaboration with the private sector.  Their audience is spot-on.  It includes 
organizational level security professionals representing all sectors and sub-sectors that 
virtually blanket the U.S. economy.  Equally as important, and oftentimes the most 
challenging aspect of any successful initiative, is that companies want to be DSAC 
members.  Unfortunately, DSAC falls short in a number of areas.  
DSAC does not have the analytical cadre to support sufficient information sharing 
with the private sector.  Currently, DSAC does not produce specifically tailored products 
with private sector considerations in mind.  In total, DSAC does not provide timely and 
actionable intelligence information to its customers.  To be the most efficient, DSAC 
should expand its analytical staff.  The staff can in turn prepare and publish a meaningful 
product custom-made for the private sector.  The DSAC analytical component should 
troll through local, national and international news outlets in search of items of interest 
and usefulness to the private sector.  Like its OSAC counterparts, DSAC should strive “to 
keep constituents informed of security issues around the world [and locally in DSAC’s 
case], as well as to feature…analytic reports, upcoming events, and surveys.”96   
                                                 
94 Domestic Security Alliance Council, “DSAC Leadership Board.” 
95 Ibid. 
96 Overseas Security Advisory Council, “Newsletter,” n.d., 
https://www.osac.gov/Pages/NewsLetter.aspx (accessed August 28, 2012). 
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Moreover, while DSAC has an impressive constituency, it lacks the consistent 
and practiced interaction with chief security officers and their government equivalents.  
Sponsoring a once-a-year conference is not enough time to develop trusted, personal 
relationships necessary to provide 360 degrees of total homeland security.  Moreover, 
DSAC does not foster bi-directional dialogue and feedback.  Aside from exchanging 
business cards at the yearly symposium, interface between the government and key 
private sector stakeholders is spotty at best.    
F. IN SUM 
This chapter exemplifies how the FBI’s existing programs are sub-par in terms of 
fostering true and complete assimilation with the private sector.  While each of the 
reviewed programs, InfraGard and the Domestic Security Alliance Council, respectively, 
offer positive interactions between the FBI and the private sector, both have faults.  
InfraGard lacks a continuous influential FBI presence; it does not afford opportunities to 
develop trusted personal relationships; its membership is indiscriminate and it does not 
produce or provide meaningful intelligence products that answer the question “What does 
this mean for my company?”   
Equally, DSAC misses the mark on encouraging and providing opportunities to 
develop trusted individual relationships between the private sector and the FBI.  In 
contrast, their target audience is the executive-level decision-maker, which is ideal.  
However, DSAC fails to encourage regular interaction and liaison building between the 
group and the FBI.  Aside from its regular seminars, DSAC does not routinely share 
information that fosters bi-directional dialogue, feedback and responsiveness between the 
FBI and its members.  This is further exemplified by its lack of disseminated intelligence 
products or routine engagements.   
Neither program offers the private sector an interactive and coordinated response 
to threats on a geographic versus sector specific level.  To illustrate, consider the 
following scenario:  A terrorist group parks a truck bomb in front of a well-known 
government contracting office building they intend to attack.  Irrespective of whether or 
not the bomb has exploded, the mitigation of this terrorist situation requires complete 
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collaboration between businesses within the affected neighborhood.  The targeted 
company at 123 Main Street, while the principal target, is unfortunately not the only 
target.  Others within 123 Main like the building’s security firm and the cleaning crew, 
the dry cleaner across the street, the deli next door, the coffee shop behind, and so on, are 
now unintentionally involved.  Arguably, to ensure this vulnerable neighborhood is 
networked and working together as a community robust outreach, training, exercises and 
interaction between both local and federal law enforcement is required.   The 
commitment to reduce neighborhood weaknesses and ensure collateral damage is reduced 
in the event of an attack should occur routinely.  To date, neither the DSAC nor 
InfraGard engage in this level of interaction.   
Neither of the described programs spearheads table top exercises, for example, to 
encourage information sharing and the development of common security interests.  As 
described above, this is crucial to a whole of community approach to security.  
Participation in exercises opens dialogue between neighboring businesses, local police 
and the FBI.  Other important lessons include the identification of gaps in contingency 
planning.  Equally important as the exercise is the follow-up training such as red cell 
teams that neither of the programs promotes.  Red cell exercises are designed to test in-
place procedures and identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in a controlled and non-
threatening environment.       
Finally, neither of the existing programs has built a mechanism for bi-directional 
intelligence sharing—specifically intelligence coming to the FBI from the private sector.  
For instance, as the private sector becomes more aware and trained on threat indicators 
and the like, more useful intelligence would be made accessible to the FBI.  This may 
manifest itself in the form of source coverage, at risk or possibly radicalized staff and 
even CCTV coverage.  In addition, because neither outcome of the described programs is 
the development of trusted relationships, access to private sector properties, assets and 
staff as described above are likely missed. 
 
 43
V. A GLIMPSE INTO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
A. THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
As previous chapters have considered the threats to the U.S. from all forms of 
terrorism, determined that the U.S. government’s policy response are unfulfilling and that 
the FBI’s current outreach efforts are insufficient, this chapter will examine the private 
sector in more detail.  After all, “Working together the public and private sectors are 
stronger than either is alone.”97  This chapter will provide a glimpse into the world of the 
private sector through the eyes of the Marriott International, Inc.  Who are they, what 
they do and how they can help the United States homeland security enterprise by 
becoming partners in the fight to secure the nation.  The Marriott has been chosen as the 
representative private sector company because of its domestic and international 
footprints, the size and diversity of its workforce, its innovative and aggressive security 
postures and the fact that the Marriott has been the victim of a number of terrorist attacks.  
B. THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN GENERAL 
Within the United States, the private sector represents the part of the economy 
that is neither government nor state controlled.  What separates the private sector from 
the government is they are owned and operated by persons seeking to generate revenue.  
The private sector, in most free-market societies, encompasses the majority of the labor 
force.98   
In the U.S., the private sector cuts across all facets of everyday life.  Goods and 
services provided by the private sector include food that is grown and consumed; a 
home’s heating and cooling; cheering for a favorite sports team; shopping for new clothes 
or other goods—numerous goods and services all the way to the smart phone that 
globally connects its user to the world.  Notably, the aforementioned chattels and services 
fall within one of the identified 18 critical infrastructure and key resources categories as 
                                                 
97 “NYPD Shield,” n.d., http://www.nypdshield.org/public/about.aspx (accessed April 12, 2011). 
98 “Private Sector; Definition of ‘Private Sector,’” n.d., Investopedia, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/private-sector.asp (accessed August 31, 2012). 
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set forth by the DHS.  According to the DHS, “Critical infrastructure are the assets, 
systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their 
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national 
economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof.”99  Significantly, 
“the vast majority of critical infrastructure in the United States is privately owned and 
operated.”100 
C. THE PRIVATE SECTOR PRE AND POST-9/11 
Prior to the attacks on 9/11, the nation as a whole and the private sector in 
particular downplayed and oftentimes dismissed the threat from terrorism.  After all, acts 
of terrorism were relegated to bombings, hijackings and hostage-taking made famous in 
the ‘70s and ‘80s.  These were more often than not acts that happened “over there” in 
some far away land many Americans would have been hard-pressed to find on a map.  
Not to mention, the U.S. was deadlocked in a battle against the spread of communism and 
the threat of nuclear war manifested and propagated by the Soviet Union.  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that private sector executives scorned security professionals within their 
own ranks, viewing security allotments as a waste of money and a drain on profits.  
Arguably, the private sector’s chief security concerns included petty crime and insider 
theft—threats that did not warrant exaggerated spending to thwart and prevent. 
September 11 marked a watershed moment not only in history but in the way 
America thought about security.  Less than a month after the attacks, President Bush 
signed an Executive Order that specifically addressed, among other issues, critical 
infrastructure protection.101  This landmark order proved to be the largest restructuring of 
the U.S. government in over 50 years.  It brought a conglomeration of government 
activities and responsibilities under the auspices of one department, the Department of  
 
                                                 
99 Department of Homeland Security, “Critical Infrastructure,” n.d., http://www.dhs.gov/critical-
infrastructure (accessed February 28, 2012). 
100 Department of Homeland Security, “About the Office of Infrastructure Protection,” n.d., 
http://www.dhs.gov/about-office-infrastructure-protection (accessed September 4, 2012). 
101 Moteff and Parfomak, Critical Infrastructure, 9.  
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Homeland Security, whose mandates included the lead on protecting critical 
infrastructure and key resources—and thus the lead on outreach to the owners and 
operators of said assets—the private sector.102 
Beyond government reform, following the 9/11 attacks the private sector began to 
view security differently.  Financial losses resulting from the assaults were estimated to 
be “between $30 and $40 billion.”103  These losses coupled with increased costs, 
especially for insurance, resulted in amplified prices passed on to consumers.  In fact, 
Robert Hartwig, president of the Insurance Information Institute underpinned the 
importance of the 9/11 on the insurance industry by stating, “It’s safe to say that no event 
has more fundamentally transformed how insurers think about risk than the Sept. 11, 
2001 terrorist attack; not Hurricane Katrina, not the Japanese earthquake, nothing, on a 
global scale.”104  
Security costs incurred by the private sector prior to the attacks were estimated to 
be nearly $40 million to $55 million dollars annually.  According to economic specialists:  
Nearly half of the total spending for security by the private sector is 
composed of a single category, security guards and other protective 
service employees.  The rest of the spending falls into such categories as 
alarms systems, computer security, locks and safes, fencing, surveillance 
cameras, safety lighting and guard dogs.105   
                                                 
102 Department of Homeland Security, “Proposal to Create the Department of Homeland Security,” 
n.d., http://www.dhs.gov/proposal-create-department-homeland-security (accessed September 4, 2012).  
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It was further surmised the price tag for post-9/11 security measures would 
increase between 50 percent to 100 percent—again, not including the cost of 
insurance.106 
D. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SECURITY 
Law enforcement officers within the varying levels of government—federal, state, 
municipal and tribal—are charged by law to keep society safe from all enemies foreign 
and domestic.  Within the auspices of their law enforcement powers, these officers can 
make arrests and conduct all types of investigations with the ultimate goal of keeping 
society safe and free of crime.  Notably, sworn law enforcement officers may use deadly 
force as deemed necessary in order to execute their law enforcement duties.   
Law enforcement officers at all of these levels are required to have a crime-free 
background and must successfully pass entrance screening and examinations.  They are 
required to complete formalized training in all variables of the job, including a working 
knowledge of laws, policies and procedure, the deadly force policy and associated 
continuum, and regular firearms training and proficiency testing.  Applicants applying for 
the FBI, as well as many other federal law enforcement agencies, must have a four-year 
college degree from and accredited institute of higher learning, be a U.S. citizen and have 
at least three years of previous work experience.  Lastly, these law enforcement officers 
are paid by the government, at whichever level, and significantly must answer to the 
people they have sworn to protect. 
On the contrary, private sector security in this instance refers to a person hired by 
privately owned organizations to act as a guard.  These guards are hired to protect private 
sector assets that may include property, personnel and proprietary information.  Private 
sector security guards do not have law enforcement powers and, therefore, are limited in 
their abilities to generally observe and report real or perceived violations of the law to 
law enforcement authorities.  They are not authorized to use force and may not make 
arrests.  This fact becomes especially concerning to the public as some security 
                                                 
106 Total cost estimates denoted as $40 million and $50 million are taken from documents denoted in 
footnotes 10 and 11, respectively. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
77. 
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companies deploy guards equipped with firearms and maintain little to no proficiency 
requirements.  In general, guards act as a deterrent to crime.  Significantly, private sector 
security is accountable to the person/organization that pays them.  A contributing factor 
to private sector security is the disparities in the pay scale.  Some private sector security 
guards make little more than minimum wage.  Ominously, there are no universal 
standards within the private sector security apparatus.  There are no minimum training 
criterions, educational minimums, background checks or even citizenship 
requirements.107    
The private sector thinks about security much differently than the government 
does.  Security is not fundamental to daily business.  Instead, security is an additional 
cost of doing business.  It is a drain on profits and must therefore be weighed carefully.  
A business’s allocation of security is based on the probability something bad will happen.  
Within limited operating budgets, organizations must make calculated decisions on where 
best to allocate resources to reduce the risk of something malicious occurring.  Risk is 
measured as: 
Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequences. 
Simply, security budgeting can be equated to gambling.  Private businesses take 
calculated chances on how robust their security postures should be in order to address 
real or perceived threats, their known weaknesses and the results or outcome should the 
business succumb to a breach.108 
E. THE MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
The private sector is a sundry of all things non-state owned.  The U.S. economy 
thrives on privately owned and operated assets not only within the U.S. but also outside 
of its borders.  American owned and operated companies have an extensive footprint in 
foreign lands, which makes them extremely important to the stability of the global 
                                                 
107 Cassandra Cochrun, “What are the Differences between Private and Public Sector Security?” n.d., 
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108 Ted Lewis and Rudy Darken, Critical Infrastructure: Vulnerability, Analysis and Protection course 
(course notes, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA).  
 48
economy.  To demonstrate the magnitude of its reach and capabilities, the Marriott 
International, Inc. (“Marriott”) will be examined.  According to the Marriott, “Travel and 
tourism is one of the world’s largest industries.”109  Because of its popularity, appeal, 
international ties and impact on global economics, the vastness of Marriott’s assets, 
capabilities and workforce will be reviewed as an example of one small piece of what the 
private sector offers. 
The Marriott is classified as part of the commercial facilities sector and finds its 
home within the lodging sub-sector.  Despite this categorization, the Marriott straddles 
other private sector delineations—frankly, as do most private sectors.  In fact, the 
Marriott is dependent upon countless other sectors in order to function.  For example, 
they rely upon the transportation sector to receive needed supplies; the 
telecommunications sector to stay connected with customers and the financial and 
banking sector to safe keep their operating funds.   
The Marriott affords accommodations both within the continental United States 
and across the globe.  There are 18 separate brands within the Marriott portfolio, 
including recognizable names like the Ritz-Carlton, Renaissance Hotels and the Fairfield 
Inn and Suites.  Significantly, Marriott diversified to include “limited service to luxury 
hotels and resorts.”110  A part of this collection also consists of executive apartments, 
furnished extended-stay locations and convention centers.111  Within a number of the 
Marriott’s assets, there are restaurants and bars often frequented by non-registered hotel 
guests.  Likewise, countless both registered and non-registered guests attend conferences, 
seminars and other special events at Marriott assets.   
Marriott owns and operates “more than 3,700 properties in over 73 countries and 
territories.”112  From 2010–2011, the corporation reported owning and operating 643,196 
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rooms world-wide.113  Marriott employs approximately 300,000 [people] across the 
globe.114  Moreover, Marriott employment opportunities are as diverse as their portfolio.  
Marriott careers are two-pronged—managerial and non-managerial—and are broken 
down into major thematic categories:  accounting and finance; revenue management; 
food and beverage; rooms operations and guest services; and sales and marketing.115  
Marriott recorded over $12 million in proceeds for the 2011 fiscal year.116   
The magnitude of the Marriott’s domestic and international influence is 
phenomenal.  They provide overnight accommodations for hundreds of thousands of 
individuals around the clock and around the globe.  Similarly, their hospitality services 
are used for meetings, seminars, conferences and special events.  The Marriott hotels are 
located in some of the most sought after locations in the world.  Equally, they are located 
in several non-permissive environments in high-risk countries that are not generally 
thought of as tourist attractions.  Perhaps most significantly, Marriott hotels are seen as 
beacons of American capitalism and prowess.  By virtue of their symbolism, U.S.-based 
companies such as the Marriott are often targeted by those seeking to destroy not only 
western ideals but certainly the U.S.  Indeed, many westerners and Americans in 
particular find their home away from home, especially in unfriendly territories, in 
American-owned corporations such as the Marriott. 
The Marriott has always emphasized security and safety for its customers.  Their 
protocols and assessments are compliant with Department of Homeland Security and 
Department of State procedures.117  As the Marriott corporation began expanding into the 
overseas marketplace, so too did they expand their internal security protocols.  They 
created a crisis management package, authored a crisis manual and selected crisis teams.  
                                                 
113 Marriott, Marriott 2011–2012 Sustainability Report, 2012, 
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They engaged in rigorous training including table top exercises.  The Marriott receives 
countless intelligence assessments and bulletins to maintain visibility on the state of 
world affairs.  They employ full-time intelligence analysts based in both Washington, 
D.C. and Hong Kong, which provides the company with “twenty-four hour capability of 
assessing risk.”118  They also developed a coded system equated to threat conditions.  
The cycle consists of Blue, Yellow and Red, blue being the lowest and red the most 
severe level of security.  Marriott highlighted, “Our risk assessments are critical to the 
allocation of resources.”  The Marriott has created further training for security guards 
located in high-risk areas.  In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, they authored an 
active shooter training program “combining physical security with operational security 
and awareness programs.” 119 
Despite their best efforts, the Marriott is no stranger to terrorism attacks.  In 
today’s threat environment, “…yesterday’s embassies are today’s hotels.  The threat 
against diplomatic targets persists but due to target hardening, the terrorists seek to attack 
international hotels.  As westerners frequent international hotels, they should be 
considered second embassies.”120   
From 2004 to 2008, the Islamabad Marriott hotel was attacked three times.  The 
attack on September 20, 2008 was considered the most dramatic and devastating as a 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device carrying a payload of approximately 600 kg 
(1,320 pounds) of explosives was detonated by its suicide driver.  While the vehicle was 
stopped from entering the hotel premises by security barriers, it somehow ignited and 
ultimately burned for two days.  The attack injured 265 and killed 56 people many of 
whom (30 people) were hotel staff employees.121    
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Prior to the Marriott attack, the security posture consisted of 62 CCTV cameras 
monitored full-time by three security personnel.  The training of their CCTV monitors is 
unknown.  Additionally, windows were reinforced with blast retention films in order to 
diminish the amount of glass fragmentation during blow-out.  They had bolstered vehicle 
inspections to include under-vehicle inspection cameras and license plate recorders 
projected into their manned security booth.  Manned security, totaling 196 security 
personnel and four explosives trained K-9s, were both visible and covert and included 
armed security at the hotel’s entrances.  In addition, the Marriott had expanded the street 
to hotel stand-off distance and installed more security barriers including the emplacement 
of new bollards, drop-down and “hydraulic Delta barriers.”122  After the attack and as a 
result of greater industry awareness, the Marriott’s security posture changed to include 
the security enhancements described in the next section. 
F. LESSONS LEARNED: NEW SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS 
After the Islamabad attack and the Mumbai assault, the Marriott collaborated to 
identify lessons learned for properties in high-risk environments.  In part, they realized 
terrorists often stay at their target hotels disguised as guests.  They use their rooms as 
staging areas and command posts providing unfettered access to the hotel’s layout and 
internal procedures.  To mitigate this, Marriott developed awareness training so hotel 
employees can recognize suspicious activity.  Additionally, when practicable, undercover 
counter-surveillance teams were identified, trained and deployed to detect hostile 
reconnaissance activities. 
Marriott found responders were unfamiliar with building lay-outs as most of the 
plans they had been supplied were outdated.  They encouraged all of their hotels to 
develop relationships with local authorities and to conduct joint training.  Lastly, they 
provided up-to-date building architecture plans to first responders in an effort to eliminate 
unnecessary delays in responding to an incident.  Marriott also suggested distributing 
recent and comprehensive pictures and applicable video footage to their authorities. 
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From the Mumbai attacks, it was learned the Taj Hotel executives decreased their 
security posture allegedly as a result of information provided by Indian powers that be.123  
The resultant lessons learned included building an in-house intelligence capability where 
manageable.  Resultantly, security personnel training in the identification and 
interpretation of threat indicators can determine mitigation actions that can then be 
executed by hotel staff.  Finally, it was determined that enhanced physical security 
measures significantly slow and may even deter an attack.124 
Marriott ensures each property has employed a number of additional security 
measures such as on-going staff training, available traveler safety tips, no room numbers 
on room keys and secondary deadlock bolts.  Furthermore, Marriott developed security 
procedures. Unfortunately, these procedures are proprietary and therefore unavailable for 
review by the public.  Finally, Marriott hotels are required to have up-to-date emergency 
plans.  At the very least, the plans are required to include “fire protection systems and 
procedures, natural disasters, procedures for handling immediate evacuation of the hotel, 
emergency reporting procedures, power failures and terrorism.”  These plans too are 
unavailable because they are confidential. 
G. MARRIOTT’S ABILITIES 
The Marriott’s capabilities are immense.  As has been discussed, the Marriott 
workforce exceeds 300,000 people, including expertise in countless job roles with 
varying responsibilities.  The size of its staff provides law enforcement with access to 
potential sources and front line detectors of suspicious activity.  Indeed, an improvised 
explosive device attack on the Marriott in Jakarta discovered the “control-centre (for the 
terrorists) was a room at the JW Marriott, room number 1808, where anti-terror police 
found explosive materials and an unexploded bomb.”125  Certainly, the Marriott’s 
housekeeping staff may have been the first to stumble onto this operation as they went 
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about their daily duties.  Training the staff to look for suspicious activity is crucial for the 
early detection of possible plots.  Simply, the staff is an enormous underutilized 
intelligence base.  Equally, the diversity of the private sector’s staff presents language 
skills and capabilities not necessarily intrinsic to or readily at the disposal of the 
government. 
As further described, the Marriott employs aggressive security measures including 
physical security enhancements, manned security staff and CCTV.  The CCTV coverage 
in particular is extremely useful to law enforcement whether it is during an event or 
previously recorded footage that can assist in an investigation.  CCTV footage is 
evidence and is always deemed important.  As was validated during the review of CCTV 
coverage from the Islamabad attack, the security staff responded in accordance with 
Marriott’s established policies and procedures.  In fact, the actions of the security staff 
undoubtedly saved countless lives. 
Lastly, the private sector as a whole has assets all over the globe.  As exhibited by 
this example, the Marriott has a foothold in 73 different countries around the world.  This 
affords law enforcement access to friendly locations wherein both intelligence and overt 
operations can take place.  It allows for some measure of control in often times non-
permissive environments and conflict zones.   
H. PRIVATE SECTOR CHALLENGES  
Information sharing has been and remains of paramount importance to the success 
of the protection of private sector assets.  Arguably, the private sector is more innovative 
and assertive when it comes to information sharing.  Notwithstanding, the private sector 
recognizes the necessity of protecting proprietary information.  Even so, private industry 
places more emphasis on the need for and necessity of sharing actionable information 
whereas the government often maintains the “need to know” posture in respect to sharing 
information.  Regardless, overwhelming cultural differences between the two remains a 
hurdle.  Furthermore, the development of trusted relationships and a workable 
information sharing platform also remain challenges. 
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There are economic pressures attached to both security and engagement with law 
enforcement.  The private sector walks a fine line between security and maintaining an 
open, inviting and appealing façade.  The public wants to feel safe, yet open and free to 
move around unfettered.  This proves challenging for the private sector’s security 
apparatus as an overly visible security presence may be seen as a turn off.  Probably most 
importantly, the private sector is in the business of making money.  Because of this, they 
have to balance their security costs against their projected profits.  Certainly shareholders 
are not going to stand for reduced earnings in exchange for amplified security measures 
countering a risk that may never come to light.   
The private sector must weigh the impact of negative press against future returns.  
For instance, if the Marriott chooses to neglect security measures which results in the loss 
of life will their decision withstand the scrutiny from the news media?  How will the 
company’s lack of response be perceived among its customers, stakeholders and future 
customers?  Unlike the government which does not rely on generating revenue, the 
members of the private sector must ensure their public message and image are always 
favorable. 
The Marriott is extremely forward-leaning in training its employees on security 
and crisis management.  Similarly, they teach all of their employees about suspicious 
activity and threat indicators.  Undeniably, people play as they practice.  In other words, 
vigorous training for any number of stressful situations will pay dividends in the long 
run.  According to author Rohan Gunaratna: 
Both the security and non-security personnel at the Islamabad Marriott had 
conducted exercises on emergency evaluation. In a crisis, most security 
and non-security staff are likely to respond the way they have been 
trained.  In the crucial seven minutes, several hundred lives were saved 
because Marriott security and non-security staff collaborated to move 
guests away from harm’s way.  If not for the staff training and exercises, 
several hundred guests might have become casualties.126   
                                                 
126 Gunaratna, The Islamabad Marriott, 14. 
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Arguably, good training leads to good intelligence.  Knowing what to look for and 
what the identified inconsistencies could mean may prove to be incredibly helpful for law 
enforcement.   
The U.S. government should interact with the private sector at all levels.  
Government outreach initiatives target varying levels of private sector engagement.  
Importantly, law enforcement in particular stands to gain more from an inclusive 
relationship.  It is necessary to recognize that everyone is important within the private 
sector.  As has been discussed, it is most certainly the housekeeping staff who will 
discover nefarious activities taking place in a hotel room they are charged to clean—not 
the global security executive who may sit thousands of miles away.   
I. IN SUMMARY 
Without the private sector many significant aspects of an American’s everyday 
life would be drastically altered.  As has been demonstrated, the private sector accounts 
for not only the production of what we eat but also where we shop, how we travel and 
how we stay connected with the world.  The magnitude of the private sector’s influence 
on everyday lives is astounding.  Moreover, the private sector is the backbone of the 
U.S.’s economy and a significant player in the global economy.    
The private sector is truly an underutilized asset.  Their infrastructure, personnel 
and germane security are, in many respects, beyond reproach.  The Marriott hotel 
example makes evident what one corporation brings to the table.  Truly, “to integrate and 
synergize capabilities, government-private sector partnership is crucial.  To better 
understand and respond to the threat environment, future hotels [and the private sector as 
a whole] should build robust and lasting partnerships with the government.”127  Indeed, 
developing a trusted relationship with security officials, such as within the Marriott, will 
likely result in access to internal, proprietary security protocols that may then be shared 
to other trusted partners. 
                                                 
127 Gunaratna, The Islamabad Marriott, 14. 
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As an example, the Marriott has the ability to influence government outreach 
efforts by providing real-life examples of how best to secure their assets with the U.S. 
and in both friendly and hostile environments overseas.  They are seasoned and 
experienced having learned through trial and error.  The Marriott can teach others how to 
employ an analytical staff to assist in assessing risk from threats both within and outside 
of the U.S.  Also, the Marriott experience in developing and deploying innovative and 
comprehensive crisis plans.  As has been described, the Marriott can support others in 
best practices for operating outside of the United States.  Lastly, because Marriott is a 
demonstrated leader in corporate security, they can significantly assist others both within 
and outside of the private sector by sharing their in-house staff training platforms.  In all, 
Marriott is a first-rate example of a company with an innovative, ever evolving security 
mindset that can benefit others.   
There are dozens of private companies such as the Marriott that the U.S. 
government and FBI could better utilize for improved security against terrorism within 
the U.S.  The question remains on how best to mobilize them.  The next chapter considers 
how the U.K. addresses this challenge within the four corners of their counterterrorism 
strategy.  Three premier U.K. private sector outreach programs will be examined to 
include a comparison between the U.K. and the U.S.    
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VI. AN EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S 
EFFORTS 
A. THE UNITED KINGDOM AS A MODEL 
This chapter will discuss CONTEST, the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) strategy for 
national security.  It will delve into a number of British outreach programs including 
Project Griffin, Project Argus and London First identified as examples of integration of 
the private sector into national security.  Finally, the chapter will culminate with a side-
by-side comparison between the U.K. and U.S. programs. 
B. HOW THE U.K. SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGE THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The United Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy, as set forth by the Home 
Office,128 is in its third iteration and is known by the moniker “CONTEST.”  
CONTEST’s primarily goals are to address the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its 
affiliated groups as well as the danger from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism 
(NIRT).129  The strategy states, “The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the U.K. 
and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and 
with confidence.”  CONTEST takes into account the rule of law and personal rights and 
protections.  Moreover, through CONTEST and in conjunction with the Strategic 
Defence [sic] and Security Review (SDSR), the U.K. understands that in order to fully 
defeat terrorism, not only must the immediate threat be addressed but also the long-term 
factors that contribute to terrorism and radicalization.  They realize the importance of 
integration with other agencies and programs is absolutely necessary.130 
                                                 
128 The United Kingdom’s Home Office is the government agency in charge of immigration, security 
and order.  Within the Home Office are the police, Border Security, and their intelligence component, 
Security Service (MI5).  The Home Office sets policy for counterterrorism, drugs, ID cards and other 
security-related matters. Wikipedia, s.v. “United Kingdom’s Home Office,” n.d., 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Office (accessed March 14, 2012). 
129 United Kingdom Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism, 2011, http://www.homeoffice.gov.U.K./publications/counter-terrorism/counter-terrorism-
strategy/contest-summary?view=Binary, 3, 5 (accessed November 18, 2011). 
130 United Kingdom Home Office, CONTEST, 3, 5. 
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CONTEST is centered on four main principles: “Pursue—to stop terrorist attacks; 
Prevent—to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; Protect—to 
strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and Prepare—to mitigate the impact of 
a terrorist attack.”131  Within this framework the U.K. does an admirable job of 
integrating the private sector—especially regarding the context of Protect.132  For 
purposes of this comparison, however, only the Prevent and Prepare subcategories will be 
considered. 
Prevent has been designated as a key component of the CONTEST strategy.  
Within Prevent, the U.K. has renewed efforts to ensure the Prevent prong is more 
effective and has changed its scope to include thwarting all forms of radicalization.  The 
U.K. recognizes the importance of free speech and therefore will not seek to change any 
of its laws.  Rather, it will promote healthy discourse in regard to terrorists’ rhetoric.  
Within Prevent, the U.K. will work to empower communities, improve social integration 
and mobility.133  Notably, the U.K.’s successful hosting of the 2012 international 
Olympic Games is evidence of their commitment to the flawless execution of their 
strategy.   
The Prepare category has a more general response allowing for maximum 
flexibility to address any number of situations.  The U.K. has outlined success within 
Prepare to include:  
 Our planning for the consequences of all civil emergencies provides us 
with the capabilities to respond to and recover from the most likely kinds 
of terrorist attacks in this country 
 We have in place additional capabilities to manage ongoing terrorist 
attacks wherever required; and 
 We have in place additional capabilities to respond to the highest impact 
risks.134 
                                                 
131 United Kingdom Home Office, CONTEST, 3, 5. 
132 Ibid., 12, 13. 
133 Ibid., 8, 9. 
134 Ibid., 14. 
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As the U.K. National Security Strategy opines, “…we need to build a much closer 
relationship between government, the private sector and the public when it comes to 
national security.”135  The strategy advocates for a “whole of government” approach to 
national security.136  The integration of the private sector is specifically highlighted 
within Prepare stating:  
Moreover, we also depend on close relationships with the private sector, 
who own much of the infrastructure and the systems that need to be 
protected. We will continue to be as transparent as we can in sharing our 
understanding of the threats we face and wherever possible will 
collaborate in the development of security solutions.137  
It is within this spirit that the U.K. integrates the private sector as full partners in 
securing their country, specifically within their Project Griffin, Project Argus and 
London First outreach programs.  
C. AN OCEAN APART, YET CLOSER THAN WE THINK 
The United Kingdom is no stranger to conflict.  Throughout their storied history 
they have been involved in wars and other skirmishes both at home and abroad.  They are 
especially practiced in dealing with guerilla warfare and later terrorism stemming from 
the unrest between the British government and Northern Ireland.  More recently, 
however, the U.K. experienced an al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist attack perpetrated by its 
own citizenry.  A group of four British-born young men killed 52 people and injured 
more than 700 on July 7, 2005 when they executed a coordinated attacked on the U.K.’s 
public transportation system during the morning rush hour.  The BBC reported the 
homegrown violent extremists were “motivated by a ‘fierce antagonism to perceived 
injustices by the West against Muslims’ and a desire for martyrdom.”138   
                                                 
135 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 2010, 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_1
91639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy (accessed November 19, 2011). 
136 Ibid., 12. 
137 Ibid., 11, 12. 
138 “7 July Bombings: Introduction,” BBC News, n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/investigation/html/introduction.stm (accessed 
April 21, 2012). 
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Resultantly, to better defend itself, the U.K. welcomed the idea of integrating its 
population, especially security professionals within the private sector, into its overall 
national security apparatus.  The U.K. accomplished the assimilation by way of the 
creation of a variety of specifically designed private sector outreach programs.  Are there 
lessons that the U.S. can learn from the British integration?  A comparative analysis of 
three of the U.K.’s outreach initiatives are described herein.  The projects examined 
included: Project Griffin, Project Argus and London First.   
D. PROJECT GRIFFIN 
Project Griffin was born within the City of London139 Police Department and was 
officially underway in April 2004 as a collaborative endeavor between the City of 
London Police and the Metropolitan Police.  The project is completely voluntary and not-
for-profit.  The Project Griffin Webpage suggests, “Its remit was to advise and 
familiarize managers, security officers and employees of large public and private sector 
organisations across the capital on security, counter-terrorism and crime prevention 
issues.”140  Because of its effectiveness and adaptability, Project Griffin has been 
deployed throughout the United Kingdom and has even been exported internationally to 
places such as Australia, the United States, Singapore, Canada and Hong Kong.  The 
impetus behind the project was to develop a comprehensive, community-based approach 
to thwarting threats from terrorism.  The project incorporates, among others, the police, 
business and private sector.141  The project’s primary mission is to: 
…engage, encourage and enable members of the community to work in 
partnership with the police to deter, detect and counter terrorist activity 
and crime.  Project Griffin seeks to enlist the help and support of 




                                                 
139 For clarity, the City of London lies within central London, England and encompasses an area of 
approximately one square mile.  Notably, the City of London, among other things, maintains its own police 
force.  Wikipedia, s.v. “City of London,” n.d., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_London (accessed 
November 18, 2011). 
140 “Project Griffin,” n.d., http://www.projectgriffin.org.U.K./ (accessed June 22, 2102).  
141 Ibid. 
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businesses, districts or neighbourhoods.  It provides an official and direct 
channel through which the police can share and update vital information 
relating to security and crime prevention.142 
Project Griffin targets security managers and lower-level security personnel.  
Approximately 24,000 security professionals have been trained throughout the U.K. and 
internationally, according to the City of London Griffin team.143  Project Griffin training 
benefits both law enforcement and the private sector in immeasurable ways.  For 
example, security professionals receive the same, standardized training which, among 
other things, ensures uniform reporting and reporting protocols.  Assets are undoubtedly 
better protected and the trained community becomes the “eyes and ears” for the police—
able to identify and report things such as hostile reconnaissance and suspicious activity.  
It is estimated that a majority of the police’s tips and leads come from Griffin alumni.144  
Project Griffin accomplishes its mission vis-a-vi a four pronged approach:  Griffin 
Awareness Days, an On-Line Refresher Course, Bridge Calls and Public Assistance.   
Griffin’s Awareness Day is a day-long indoctrination training session consisting 
of a number of briefings provided by police officers.  The topics vary and start with a 
chilling video memorializing a number of terrorist attacks throughout the world.  The first 
agenda item is a very detailed, thorough threat briefing provided by Special Branch.145  
Spoken in laymen’s terms, the threat briefing delivers a comprehensive account of the 
most notable terrorist organization threatening the U.K.—al-Qa’ida.  The briefing 
outlines the history of al-Qa’ida, highlights al-Qa’ida’s goals and objectives and provides 
a time-line recollection of major al-Qa’ida operations culminating with the 9/11 attacks 
on the U.S.  The segment also touches on al-Qa’ida today and threats faced from al-
                                                 
142 “Project Griffin.” 
143 Ian Mansfield, Teresa Russell, Matt Hone, and Trevor Dyson in discussion with author, January 
12, 2012.  
144 Ibid.  
145 Special Branch is part of the Metropolitan Police’s Counter-Terrorism Command, SO15.  Special 
Branch is responsible for, among other things, national security matters, protection of VIPs (non-royal), sea 
and airport examining officers and intelligence work.  Special Branch works hand in glove with MI-5.  
Wikipedia, s.v., “Special Branch,” n.d., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Branch (accessed June 22, 
2012). 
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Qa’ida-inspired homegrown radicals.  Additionally, because of its significance to the 
U.K., Northern Irish Related Terrorism is discussed.   
The Awareness Day carries on with other comprehensive briefings, such as 
recognizing explosive devices.  This discussion hits upon topics such as person-borne 
improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.  Crime 
scene management and current crime trends and methods of operation are also discussed.  
Briefings on the subjects of identifying suspicious activity and hostile reconnaissance 
provide attendees with examples of nefarious activity.  The goal is for each participant to 
walk away from the training with an understanding of how suspicious activities may 
manifest themselves—albeit criminal or terrorist in nature.  Importantly, the group is 
trained to recognize hostile reconnaissance.  Distinguishing pre-operational surveillance 
may very well be a key to thwarting an intended evil action—the importance of which is 
not underestimated by the Griffin staff.   
Armed with these indicators, the goal is to teach the participants about nefarious 
activities and raise their levels of understanding and alertness.  Consequence management 
is discussed with special emphasis placed on business continuity of operations.  At the 
end of the training course, each participant receives a Project Griffin certificate and 
becomes part of the network of Griffin graduates.  Griffin training has become so popular 
and well respected it is “fully endorsed and supported by the Security Industry Authority 
(SIA)146 and Skills for Security.”147  Griffin graduates form an interconnected net that 
blankets the city (of London, in this example) able to assist the local police force by 
virtue of their heightened awareness and basic training in recognizing things/activities 
that, for them, are out of the ordinary.  
The On-Line Refresher Course is an interactive, scenario-based computer module.  
The refresher rehashes some of the Awareness Day training and serves as a simple and 
                                                 
146 The Security Industry Authority is governing body responsible for setting, maintaining and 
regulating the private security industry within the U.K. “Home Office,” n.d., 
http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.U.K./Pages/home.aspx  (accessed March 21, 2012).  
147 “Project Griffin.” “Skills for Security, the skills body for the security industry, works with 
employers to improve security skills and standards of professionalism, by providing access to security 
training courses and security qualifications, for people employed in private security roles across the U.K..” 
“Skills for Security,” n.d., http://www.skillsforsecurity.org.U.K./ (accessed March 21, 2012). 
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cost effective method for Griffin registered personnel to stay informed and receive 
important messages from the police without having to leave their home or office.  A year 
after completing the Griffin Awareness Day, graduates are eligible to partake in the 
refresher course.  The refresher consists of an hour long series of “interactive, video clips 
and question and answer sections guiding learners as they work through each module.”148  
In each, various scenarios are presented to the participant who must “select the correct 
course of action” in order to successfully complete and receive recognition for the 
course.149  Upon completion, participants are better attuned to the latest techniques, 
tactics and procedures used by terrorists and criminals.  Moreover, scenarios may be 
viewed multiple times to ensure the delivered message and the proper courses of action 
are understood by the student.   
Bridge Calls are used to push information very quickly to the Griffin network.  
They occur regularly and may take place using a SMS, email, pager or conference calls.  
Bridge Calls, by whatever method chosen, are an excellent way for critical information to 
reach a large audience very quickly.  They assist in keeping the community both 
informed and aware of events that may affect them.  Information delivered may include 
“updates and intelligence on terrorism/extremism and other crime-related issues.  They 
are also used for specific local situations, such as measures to be employed in times of an 
emergency.”150  Importantly, based upon the communication received, security personnel 
are able to react—perhaps resulting in 100 percent identification checks or vehicle 
sweeps with a canine. 
Public Assistance may be called upon in times of emergency.  For instance, the 
police may muster Griffin graduates to assist with cordons or perhaps a high visibility 
neighborhood watch.151  In fact, Project Griffin alumni assisted officials in the aftermath 
of the 7/7 bombings in London.  They were asked to help with spearheading general 
public awareness and guide the community on how to react to a terrorist event.  And, 
                                                 





Griffin alumni were tasked to display a heightened presence of security staff so as to 
provide a visible message of reassurance.152  The formation of a well-informed, 
uniformly trained brigade of private citizenry is a force multiplier for police—especially 
in crisis situations.  Notably in April of 2009, “Project Griffin guards deployed for [the] 
G20.”153 
In sum, Project Griffin is a very effective police outreach program that enlists the 
influence and passion of the public by empowering them to recognize and report 
suspicious activity, become cognizant of current threats, gather and share information, 
garner and maintain trust in the police and feel like part of the solution to problems facing 
their community.  Project Griffin is also recruiting the participation of highly targeted 
infrastructure such as Gatwick Airport—the first airport to join Griffin—effective March 
2008 and, as of January 2010; Griffin is piloting a project with the Safer Transport 
Command with London Buses.154 
E. PROJECT ARGUS 
Project Argus was started in 2007 and dovetails with Project Griffin.  While in 
the same vein, Argus differs in that it is program-managed by the National Counter 
Terrorism Security Office (NaTSCO).  The NaCTSO: 
…is a police unit co-located within the Centre for Protection of National 
Infrastructure….(CPNI)…. NaCTSO contributes to the U.K. government’s 
counter terrorism strategy (CONTEST) supporting the Protect and Prepare 
strands of the strategy….  NaCTSO counter terrorism and security work is 
divided into three areas:  Protection of crowded places; Protection of 
hazardous sites and dangerous substances; and Assisting the CPNI to 
protect the Critical National Infrastructure.155 
The Project Argus initiative was designed to assist businesses, whether small, 
individually owned or national chains, to plan for, prevent, handle and recover from a 
                                                 
152 David Warner (SO20 Counter Terrorism Protective Security Command at New Scotland Yard), 
personal correspondence, June 2012. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, “NaCTSO: Who We Are and What We Do,” n.d., 
http://www.nactso.gov.uk/Default.aspx (accessed June 22, 2012).  
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terrorist attack.  The project accomplishes these tasks by directing businesses through a 
simulated terrorist attack.  The driving idea behind the exercise is to demonstrate the 
significance of being involved in a major terrorist event, identifying lessons learned, and 
developing best practices that will ultimately protect the individuals’ businesses, their 
staff, assets, customers and overall community.156  
The Argus training is a free event and focuses on decision makers versus the 
private sector’s lower-level security professionals pin-pointed in the Griffin training.  
Project Argus employs the use of technology to reach a wide audience at little expense to 
the customer.  Argus uses an interactive DVD that presents a number of terrorist 
situations from a night club scene to a Mumbai-style hostile attack.157  The Project Argus 
DVD is an approximately two to three hour multi-media simulation exercise during 
which the participants make decisions and answer questions in a workbook they keep as a 
reference.  Among other things, the scenarios focus on spotting and assessing hostile 
reconnaissance. This project encourages private sector security decision makers to 
consider their current reaction plans for handling an unexpected event.  Topics include: 
shelter-in-place versus evacuation, contingency plans and planning, “go kits” and 
continuity of operations plans. 158 
Project Argus cuts across traditional sector specific lines and encourages 
community and neighborhood involvement.  Argus inspires information sharing beyond 
established personal relationships and endeavors to inform versus alarm its 
constituency.159  The exercise is designed around “a series of questions and challenges… 
[which] are put to…[the participant], both individually and as a group.  [Each 
participant]…will work in small syndicate groups with other local business 
representatives and develop… [appropriate] responses to the attack.”160 
                                                 
156 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, “NaCTSO.” 
157 Richard Prior (Inspector, New Scotland Yard), personal meeting, January 12, 2012.  
158 This information originated from a personal meeting with members of the National Counter 
Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO); London, England; January 11, 2012.   
159 Prior, personal meeting. 
160 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, “Project Argus,” n.d., 
http://www.nactso.gov.U.K./OurServices/Argus.aspx (accessed March 18, 2012).  
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In addition to the business-focused Project Argus, the NaCTSO launched Argus 
Professional in 2008.  Argus Professional is designed: 
…to target planning, architect and design professionals to raise awareness 
of designing in counter terrorism protective security measures at the 
design concept stage. These professions have been identified as being able 
to play a significant role in reducing vulnerability, hence the aim of Argus 
Professional is to encourage debate, and demonstrate that counter 
terrorism measures can be designed into structures and space to create 
safer crowded places.161  
The success of both Projects Griffin and Argus should not be understated.  The 
programs are highly touted by both the police and private sector.  For example, the 
private sector found that participation in these two projects identified a major gap in their 
own security in that they found private businesses were not talking with each other.  
Participation in these projects highlighted this kink and facilitated a solution through 
community interaction vis-a-vi Projects Griffin and Argus.  Part of the solution, simply 
stated, involved meeting fellow neighbors and exchanging contact information.  
Moreover, membership in these projects enables private security staff to access, share and 
gather information that was otherwise unavailable or not shared—it is now only a 
telephone call away.162   
F. LONDON FIRST 
London First is a not for profit delegation representing 32 industries and blue-chip 
London-based businesses serving to bring together the government and private sector.  
The project identified 24 specific sectors such as “financial and business services, 
property, transport, ICT, creative industries, hospitality and retail.”163  London First’s 
membership “also includes higher education institutions and further education 
colleges.”164  Within each division, representatives were chosen to act as a principal lead 
for the distribution and collection of information from within their respective regions.  
                                                 
161 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, “Project Argus.” 
162 Rajeev Pradham (Operations Director for Lynx), personal meeting, January 13, 2012. 
163 “London First,” n.d., http://www.londonfirst.co.uk/about-us/ (accessed June 22, 2012). 
164 “London First.” 
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The sector leads are conduits between information provided by the police and the sharing 
of that information throughout their own trusted subdivision networks.  London First 
hinges on the understanding that sharing information with the private sector is 
paramount.165  London First sets forth to “…provide our members with an effective 
conduit for communication with [the] government and [establish] a voice in the public 
arena.”166 
London First, in cooperation with the National Counter Terrorism Security 
Office, Metropolitan Police, produced and distributed pamphlets to local entities across 
the U.K.  The brochure’s topics included, among others, counter terrorism and continuity 
of business operations.  Inasmuch as London was the host city for the 2012 Olympic 
Games, through London First’s Security and Resilience Network, materials such as 
“London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy (2011) and “Home 
Office London 2012 Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSSRA) 
and Risk Mitigation Process (2011)” were made available to the network of London First 
participants.167  It is estimated, prior to the distribution of Olympics materials, over 500 
businesses were positively affected by the literature.  This endeavor has been touted as a 
success through London First’s Safer Business focused efforts.168  Arguably, the 
achievement lies in the vastness of the distribution of information and the connectivity it 
encouraged and facilitated.  
As mentioned above, within London First sits the Security and Resilience 
Network.  The network encourages the police, security services and businesses to work 
jointly in furtherance of promoting safety, building resistance and thwarting terrorism and 
other crimes.  The Resilience Network is “supported by the Metropolitan Police, City of 
                                                 
165 Chris Wilson (London First member) and Graham Brown (Communities Together Strategic 
Engagement Team), personal meeting, January12, 2012.  
166 “London First.” 
167 “Security and Resilience Network: Guidance,” n.d., London First, 
http://www.londonfirst.co.uk/networks2/security--resilience/security-and-resilience-networ2/  (accessed 
June 21, 2012).  
168 “Our Sucesses,” n.d., London First, http://www.londonfirst.co.U.K./our-successes/, (accessed April 
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London Police, British Transport Police and the Home Office.”169  To exemplify their 
information sharing capabilities, “police message alerts” are dispatched during crisis 
events.  These alerts are “cascaded by London First.”170  Members actively collaborate to 
produce publications outlining best practices and other guides in addition to playing a 
part in exercises designed by police, security and business experts.  The Network, as 
highlighted above, ensures useful guides are available to its constituency covering a 
variety of topics, aside from the Olympics, to “Secure in the Knowledge: Building a 
Secure Business” and “Chemical, Biological and Radiological Threats: Good Practice for 
Business.” 171  The Network provides “one stop shopping” for businesses seeking advice, 
best practices or simply information on unfamiliar topics.  Equally important, is the 
material is all available on-line and at no cost to the customer. 
Cooperation with the police has proven to be unparalleled within London First’s 
Leadership Exchange program.  The scheme “encourages the sharing of leadership and 
management expertise to improve [the] operational effectiveness of London’s police 
services.”172  The Leadership Exchange is an innovative approach to bridging the gap 
between business and police leaders.  In the hopes of bringing together years of 
knowledge and experience, the Leadership Exchange partners capable leaders, on a 
voluntary basis, from business and police and fosters information sharing in a “joint 
mentoring scheme.”173  It is estimated that over 400 individuals have participated in the 
program since its creation in 2001.174 
Attendees of the program from the private sector are senior, executive-level 
managers within their respective business.  The law enforcement participants are 
similarly comprised of senior police officers and staff from the three principle police 
                                                 
169 “Networks,” n.d., London First, http://www.londonfirst.co.U.K./networks2/ (accessed March 18, 
2012). 
170 Ibid. 
171 “Security and Resilience Network.” 
172 “Making a Difference,” n.d., London First, http://www.londonfirst.co.U.K./about-us/making-a-
difference/ (accessed March 18, 2012).  
173 Leadership Exchange, Sharing Expertise between Police and Business Leaders (London: 
Leadership Exchange, n.d.), 4. 
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forces across London, “and increasingly from services across the U.K.”175  The 
underpinnings of the program are to exchange knowledge on leadership, swap 
management best practices and lessons learned as well as develop a better understanding 
of the challenges facing each respective organization.  All of this takes place in a non-
confrontational positive setting. 
The time commitment associated with participation in the exchange amounts to an 
hour-long meeting once a month for a year’s time.  At the end of the year, participants 
can opt to continue meeting with the same colleague with whom they have been 
interacting, or may choose to be matched with someone new.  The Leadership Exchange 
coordinators take great care in carefully matching participants based on skill sets and 
needs of participants.  In an effort to stave off issues, program coordinators periodically 
check with the participants to gauge levels of overall satisfaction.  While problems may 
occur, such as guarded conversations, time commitment discrepancies or personality 
conflicts, each participant is aware of and is asked to abide by the three core principles of 
the scheme:  Diversity, Confidentiality and Integrity.176   
The following partner testimonials bring to light the significance of the 
Leadership Exchange: 
Janet Williams, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police 
Service (matched with the Director, National Portrait Gallery)—“The 
Leadership Exchange Program has enabled me to have the freedom to 
explore ideas about creativity, management challenges and effective 
leadership with a wonderfully generous and skilled person in  a safe but 
intellectually challenging environment.  Oh, and it’s been fun!”177 
And, her colleague: 
Sandy Nairne, Director, National Portrait Gallery—“The Leadership 
Exchange Programme has offered me a great chance to share important 
thinking with a fascinating person from a very different walk of life than 
my own—someone that I would never otherwise have had the opportunity 
to talk with.  We swap ideas about management—about priorities and 
                                                 
175 Leadership Exchange, Sharing Expertise, 4. 
176 Ibid., 6, 8, 9, 11, 13. 
177 Ibid., Sharing Expertise, 8. 
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pressure within work—as well as trying to help each other to think 
creatively about the challenges that we each face.”178 
London First is an excellent example of the police tapping into an existing private 
sector organization and exploiting its effectiveness to reach a common goal.  Within this 
community, everyone understands the importance of providing something—any 
information—even if it appears unimportant or meaningless.  Moreover, everyone 
recognizes timely information passage is paramount.  There is an overall awareness that 
information is being provided to the private sector in order for them to make a decision.  
Within this culture of cooperation, the U.K. is attempting to break down barriers, manage 
expectations and realize the importance of sharing information.179   
G. A SIDE-BY-SIDE LOOK: THE U.K. AND U.S.  
The feasibility of incorporating some version of the U.K.’s private sector outreach 
programs in the U.S. is limitless.  The cost of employing any or all of these programs 
would be minimal inasmuch as there are arguably only two major expenses.  The bigger 
of the two expenditures would be the start-up costs associated with developing the 
training curriculum and materials.  Secondly, the price of human capital, which should be 
accounted for as a part of the overhead.  Specifically, training and deploying instructors 
and accounting for time away from everyday duties is an incidental cost to the 
deployment of these programs within the U.S. 
Furthermore, while there are significant differences between the U.S. and U.K., 
namely size and population, there are many valuable lessons to be learned from the 
existing, highly successful, British programs.  According to the Report of the Official 
Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, over 6,000 hours of CCTV footage 
were reviewed in conjunction with the investigation.180  CCTV, largely owned by the 
private sector, proved to be invaluable in producing a time line of the events on that 
                                                 
178 Leadership Exchange, Sharing Expertise, 10. 
179 Wilson and Brown, personal meeting.  
180 London Stationery Office, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 
2005, 2006, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_06_narrative.pdf (accessed 
April 22, 2012).  
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fateful day in July of 2005.  Yet another example of the importance of maintaining a 
trained community includes the realization that three of the four suicide attackers may 
have conducted at least one recce of their targets prior to the actual attacks.  Again 
through the use of CCTV, it appears the three had engaged in pre-operational surveillance 
by taking the same route only days before the attacks on the seventh.181  Perhaps a better 
trained security staff would have identified the hostile reconnaissance and at the very 
least alerted authorities to the suspicious behavior.     
Project Griffin’s adaptability is evidenced in the U.S. at the local police 
municipality level.  The New York Police Department (NYPD) morphed Project Griffin 
into what they call the NYPD Shield.  The Shield is an information sharing platform 
specifically focusing on combatting terrorism.  The Shield sprang from Project Griffin 
and “…is a public-private partnership based on providing best practices, lessons learned, 
counterterrorism training opportunities, and information sharing.  The Shield seeks to 
partner with private sector security managers with the goal of protecting New York City 
from terrorist attacks.”182  The Shield incorporates many of the same principles and 
ideals as Project Griffin.  New York City was an excellent location in which to attempt 
an adaptation of the U.K.’s initiative because of its population, number of private sector 
entities and the size of their police department.  One city police department and, 
therefore, one chain of command undoubtedly helped with the implementation of the 
project, as well.   
Scalability from the U.K. to the U.S. would be a significant hurdle.  As of March 
2010, the U.K. reported 56 police and constabulary forces with approximately 175,248 
police officers.183  Conversely, data indicates the United States employs approximately 
900,000 sworn law enforcement officers.184  Moreover, the United States maintains 
thousands of state, local, federal and tribal police forces within our borders.  These facts 
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alone will make the incorporation of a standardized police outreach program with the 
private sector extremely challenging.  Additionally, because of the sheer size of the 
United States, the threat from terrorism, for example, is much greater in Washington, 
D.C. than it is in Valparaiso, Indiana.  For this reason alone, a roll-out at the federal level 
would be much easier to accomplish.  Incorporation at the federal level, specifically 
within the FBI, allows for standardization across 56 field offices as opposed to countless 
disparate police entities.  Moreover, if the fusion occurs at the field office Special Agent 
in Charge (SAC) level, this will ensure top-level support as well as consistency. 
There is no question public acceptance of government to private sector outreach 
would be welcomed.  In its study, the 2012 National Infrastructure Advisory Council 
(NIAC)185 found: 
The Council strongly believes that the government is missing an 
opportunity to better leverage the capabilities and resources of private 
sector owners and operators to reduce risks to critical infrastructures. To 
meet this challenge, however, significant improvement will be needed on 
how intelligence information is identified, developed, and shared among 
public and private partners.  The Council believes that the voluntary 
public-private partnership is the best long-term strategy to secure our 
critical infrastructures. 186 
The majority of the United States’ critical infrastructure, sectors and sub-sectors 
are privately owned.  If the aforementioned statement is any indication of the feelings 
within the private sector, it is undeniable they would support more government outreach 
and certainly better intelligence information sharing. 
Research indicates there is no legal or Constitutional prohibition to government 
engagement with the private sector.  In fact, as previously indicated, there are a number 
of Presidential Directives and strategies highlighting the need for developing a more 
robust relationship between the government and the private sector.  Not unlike the U.K., 
                                                 
185 The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) is a presidential appointed committee 
consisting of approximately 30 members representing the private sector, state and local government and 
academia all of whom are charged with advising the President on the security of critical infrastructure and 
their information systems.  Department of Homeland Security, “National Infrastructure Advisory Council,” 
n.d., http://www.dhs.gov/files/committees/editorial_0353.shtm (accessed March 18, 2012).  
186 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Intelligence Information Sharing, 15. 
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the U.S. should enlist a holistic approach to protecting the homeland and must 
incorporate the necessity of community outreach in its every day operating procedures.   
Politically, engaging the private sector has been a topic of discussion since at least 
1998 when it was written about in the 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 63.  Most 
recently, the 2012 NIAC study recommended a whole of government approach to 
securing the homeland that should be accomplished either through Presidential Policy 
Directive or whatever other means are available.187  Indeed, enacting White House 
directives is not enough to ensure success.  A cultural shift must be enacted within 
traditional law enforcement and the intelligence community wherein the “need to know” 
mentality is replaced with one of a “need to share.” 
H. COMPARED TO INFRAGARD 
Certainly, the U.K.’s Project Griffin and Project Argus align closely with the 
U.S.’s InfraGard program.  They all encourage open and all-inclusive participation.  They 
all strive to inform their constituents about threat indicators and updated terrorist tactics, 
techniques and procedures.  None fosters trusted relationships between private sector 
participants and the police. 
They differ in that neither of the two British programs involves on-going 
meetings, which InfraGard holds routinely.  And, whereas the U.K. programs are police 
led, InfraGard is only sponsored and not directed by the FBI.  Also, training from the 
U.K. programs is relevant, evolving and specific to threats from terrorism.  Conversely, 
InfraGard focuses on all threats and was founded based on the threat to critical 
infrastructure from cyber-attacks. 
I. WHAT WE GAIN 
There is no down side to encouraging community participation in making 
neighborhoods safer.  A whole of community approach is essential to fostering a 
ubiquitous sense of well-being.  Specifically within the homeland security framework,  
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incorporating versus alienating private sector owners and operators is long overdue.  The 
private sector has a tremendous amount of personnel and assets available which, if tasked 
and properly managed, can assist the government.   
The private sector, for example, employs thousands of people.  Access to staff, 
either as “eyes and ears” on the ground and/or as intelligence collection platforms would 
be genuinely helpful to law enforcement.  Moreover, access to records, assets and 
indigenous CCTV footage could potentially provide priceless investigative assistance to 
law enforcement officials.  As evidenced in the Post-7/7 report, CCTV coverage proved 
invaluable to piecing together the relationship of the suicide attackers and the timeline of 
the event.   
J. IN CONCLUSION 
The United Kingdom is very forward leaning in their approaches to combatting 
terrorism through a whole of community stand point.  Their national strategy, 
CONTEST, succinctly breaks down strategy into four manageable subcategories: Pursue, 
Prevent, Protect and Prepare.  The British people seem to understand the dire importance 
of corralling all possible resources and thinking outside of the proverbial box to address a 
problem.  Projects Griffin, Argus and London First are examples of this innovative 
thinking put into action.  These initiatives fully integrate its citizenry in the security of 
their nation.  There are many positive aspects of these programs that are transferable to 
the United States such as training and information sharing.  While scalability is an issue, 
nothing is insurmountable.  Integrating the private sector into the U.S.’s security battles is 
an absolutely necessary paradigm shift that is long overdue.  
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VII. THE FBI’S ANSWER IS “TOUCHSTONE” 
A. INTRODUCTION TO TOUCHSTONE 
Having discussed the successful private sector outreach programs within the U.K, 
this chapter will describe the FBI’s own innovative private company outreach efforts—
Touchstone.  The business process for the development and deployment of an FBI 
office’s Touchstone group will be explained in detail.  Touchstone answers the “who, 
what, when, where and why’s” regarding the integration of the private sector as full 
partners in the homeland security enterprise.  By the end, a Special Agent in Charge 
(SAC) will be able to export the D.C. Touchstone model to his or her own field office 
thereby closing the loop on collaboration within his or her areas of responsibility in order 
to better address today’s threats.   
B. TOUCHSTONE—AN EXAMPLE OF INNOVATIVE AND DISRUPTIVE 
THINKING 
According to the American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 
“touchstone” is defined as: “An excellent quality or example that is used to test the 
excellence or genuineness of others: ‘the qualities of courage and vision that are the 
touchstones of leadership’ (Henry A. Kissinger).”188 This definition epitomizes the 
concept behind the Touchstone Project underway in Washington, D.C.   
The Touchstone Project, “Touchstone,” is an example of breaking free of 
traditional roles and responsibilities and creating new avenues aimed at robust 
information sharing and overall engagement by the FBI with key private sector 
stakeholders.  Touchstone is a ground breaking proposal that moves beyond the out-of-
date “meet and greet” level of engagement with the private sector and into the realm of 
making key private sector stakeholders genuine partners within the homeland security 
enterprise.  Deploying Project Touchstone in the FBI is an example of a seismic shift in 
                                                 
188 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.), s.v. “Touchstone,” 2009, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/touchstone (accessed July 11, 2012).  
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thinking for an organization made famous for investigating historic gangsters like Al 
Capone, John Dillinger and Bonnie and Clyde.189   
Strategically, the long-term vision is to establish a Touchstone group in each of 
the FBI’s 56 field offices throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.  A SAC, or 
designee, should lead his or her respective field office’s Touchstone group.  This is an 
example of planning for the uncertain future—especially as it relates to today’s threats. 
C. WHY TOUCHSTONE IS A NECESSARY EVOLUTION 
Through legislation and otherwise, the stove-piping of information within the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities (IC) has been, to a large extent, reduced.  
State, local, tribal and other federal partners have been fully integrated within Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) throughout the country.  The citizenry has even been 
asked to partake in homeland security through the Department of Homeland Security’s 
“See Something; Say Something” campaign.  Rendering the private sector full partners 
will lead to the fortification of especially enticing soft targets—soft because they afford 
open access to the public and little to no security.  As the National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism points out, “Presenting the United States as a ‘hardened’ target is 
unlikely to cause al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents to abandon terrorism, but it 
can deter them from attacking particular targets or persuade them that their efforts are 
unlikely to succeed.”190   
Notwithstanding, when information materializes that is specific and believed 
credible, the FBI has a duty to warn its citizens of harm that may potentially befall them.  
Here’s a scenario to consider:  It is days after Usama bin Laden is killed in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan by U.S. Special Forces during a highly secret, extremely dangerous assault.  The 
extremist world erupts in anger vowing to avenge the death of their beloved patriarch.  
Extremist Websites are flooded with posts.  One Website in particular, known for its 
influential administrator and contributors, contains more than rhetoric.  This Website has 
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190 White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2011), 8. 
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called upon the sympathetic to enact retribution against a specific U.S. company and their 
CEOs known to have supported the coalition war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This 
company is headquartered within the Washington Field Offices’ area of responsibility.   
The SAC of the Washington Field Counterterrorism Division has a duty to warn 
this company and its employees of the impending threat so they can take appropriate 
security measures, as they deem necessary.  How should the SAC go about making this 
notification as there is no established relationship with this company?    Ultimately, the 
SAC would “cold calls” the business and speak with the head of security.  The warning 
gets passed and the SAC’s duty to warn is complete…or is it?   
What the SAC failed to realize was the building in which this company resides is 
a multi-tenant building and they simply lease space.  There are at least three other 
companies co-located in this particular office building, two of which are companies who 
also deal exclusively in contracting with the U.S. military.  Moreover, the targeted 
company does not have its own security staff, instead opting to outsource their security to 
a locally renowned security firm.  Upon further examination, it is learned there is an in-
house parking garage located below the building with both employee and public parking 
spaces.  The parking garage is owned and operated by a local parking company.  The 
target company resides on a campus of other commercial buildings, parking garages and 
eateries.  Not only that, but it is likely the reconnaissance for the operation will take place 
in the coffee shop across the street as it provides the cover of being a public location 
wherein it is not uncommon for patrons to stay for extended periods of time, often times 
while using computers and cell phones.  Therefore, this coffee shop has an absolute 
interest in knowing about the reported threat. 
It becomes evident very quickly that one telephone call to only the target 
company alone is simply not enough.  An attack of any sort on the company described 
above leaves many others completely in the dark about a looming threat that could at the 
end of the day unwittingly harm them.  It is easy to think of a number of additional 
uninvolved parties such as janitorial staffs and even trash collection that could also be 
affected.   
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This is where Touchstone enters the picture.  Touchstone bridges the gap and, by 
virtue of the influence of its members, blankets the private sector.  Eliciting the 
participation of the private sector in protecting the homeland is the last bastion in 
completing the homeland security continuum.  It is time to enlist the members of the 
private sector and make them full partners in the combating of terrorism and the leaders 
in promoting security and resiliency. 
D. WHY HAS THE PRIVATE SECTOR NOT BEEN INTEGRATED?   
According to research by the Congressional Research Service, “Some argue that 
intelligence officials have tended to err on the side of maintaining the security of 
information even at the cost of not sharing essential data with those having a need to 
know.”191  Realistically, many within government and law enforcement do not even 
consider the private sector when they think of securing the homeland because they are not 
known as traditional partners.  Yet, time and again, terrorist groups have attacked, or 
planned attacks, on privately owned assets.  Looking at terrorist attacks in hindsight, had 
security managers, such as hotel security staff, been notified of threat information, 
proactive security measures could have been enacted which may have drastically altered 
the ill-fated outcomes.  For example, perhaps security managers could have asked for 
increased police foot and mobile patrols in and around their property, or maybe they 
could have elicited K-9 units to make rounds as a very visible deterrent.   
Others argue intelligence information sharing with the private sector is outside of 
their mandated responsibilities.  In this case, non-traditional roles often fall to the 
wayside as one agency has or takes the time, personnel, budget or desire to stray off 
course from their designated mission set.  In that same vein, the private sector is not 
generally seen as a contributor to fully comprehending today’s threats.  After all, the 
private sector is only concerned about making money, right?  As a result, thinking 
continues on the micro versus macro level. 
                                                 
191 Richard A. Best Jr., Intelligence Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2011), 8. 
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Moreover, most in government do not understand the needs or capabilities of the 
private sector.  Because of this, the idea of information sharing becomes clouded, marred 
with the attitude of, “I’ll tell them what they need to know when I think they need to 
know it,” versus the sharing of intelligence information that is actionable, timely, specific 
and encourages bi-directional feedback.  Resultantly, the private sector is overlooked as 
necessary recipients of potentially crucial information.   
There is no doubt today’s information sharing network is complex and often times 












Figure 1.   The Current Intelligence Sharing Network 
The U.S. intelligence community alone is:  
…a coalition of 17 agencies and organizations…that work both 
independently and collaboratively to gather the intelligence necessary to 
conduct foreign relations and national security activities.  … [Its] primary 
mission is to collect and convey the essential information the President 
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and members of the policymaking, law enforcement, and military 
communities require to execute their appointed duties.192   
Add in intelligence information collection at the fusion centers and at the state, 
local and tribal levels of government and the information sharing environment quickly 
becomes an example of a massive, disjointed complex adaptive system.  In other words, 
“a system in which large networks of components with no central control and simple 
rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information 
processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution.”193 
In part, the intricacy described above has manifested itself in the private 
sector’s perception of our homeland security system as being perplexing 
and cumbersome.  Because of these and other factors, the private sector 
has been relegated to the sidelines of the homeland security game.  So, 
they started their own game in which they act as the coaches and captains 
begging for rules from the government referees—rules which have yet to 
materialize.  Hence, private sector security apparatuses have relied upon 
established relationships and “reach back” to former colleagues, often in 
either the law enforcement or intelligence communities, to obtain greatly 
needed information.   
Additionally, there is no single point of contact within government to act as the 
conduit with the private sector.  Most every government agency has outreach programs, 
sometime multiple programs.  For example, as has been discussed, the FBI has seven 
private sector outreach programs including InfraGard, fusion centers, the Domestic 
Security Alliance Council (DSAC), and the Counterintelligence Division’s Strategic 
Partnership Initiative, among others.194  To the private sector, the government looks 
disjointed and unorganized.   
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community/ (accessed July 15, 2012). 
193 Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour (Kindle version) (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
2009), 308. 
194 “Partnerships and Outreach.” 
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While the DHS has the lead for critical infrastructure and key resource 
protection,195 it does not own threat information.  Therefore, allowing the DHS to 
unilaterally provide protection information without providing context to the message as it 
relates to the current threat picture is, in essence, providing the private sector with an 
incomplete picture.  Without Touchstone, which integrates DHS and the FBI, there is no 
formal process to ensure cross-agency coordination.   
E. THERE ARE SOME CHALLENGES  
Embracing the idea of incorporating the private sector into the homeland security 
family requires a paradigm shift within the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities.  Traditionally, both communities have been reticent about information 
sharing in order to protect sources and methods.  While understandable, the other side of 
the equation involves a cultural mindset that has been extremely difficult to penetrate and 
change.  Changing people’s mindsets presents an especially interesting dilemma “because 
an organization’s culture comprises an interlocking set of goals, roles, processes, values, 
communications practices, attitudes and assumptions.  The elements fit together as an 
[sic] mutually reinforcing system and combine to prevent any attempt to change it.”196  
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.  Equally, Touchstone is only as resilient as 
its most unprotected partner.   
As with any partnership, it is essential the atmosphere surrounding the alliance be 
collaborative versus competitive.  While it is true, some of the members of an office’s 
Touchstone group will be industry competitors, at no point should information divulged 
or provided during Touchstone sessions be used to further ones’ competitive advantage.   
 
                                                 
195 Reference Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). “This directive establishes the 
U.S. policy for ‘enhancing protection of the Nation’s CIKR’ and mandates a national plan to actuate that 
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In order for Touchstone to work, much like London First, it has to be a rivalry-free 
environment wherein information shared is used in furtherance of overall security and not 
to “get a leg up.”    
The protection of information should not be understated.  According to research 
on Intelligence Issues at the behest of Congress, “Agencies that obtain highly sensitive 
information are reluctant to share it throughout the intelligence community out of a 
determination to protect their sources….  The unauthorized release of classified 
documents in 2010 by major newspapers and the Wikileaks website underscored, 
however, the risks of widespread dissemination of sensitive information.”197  The 
divulgence of critical, highly sensitive information can have extreme consequences on 
not only national security but human lives.  Information security is an enormous concern 
when considering discussing sensitive information outside of traditional intelligence 
channels. 
Perhaps most pointedly, on the surface there are seemingly no incentives for 
government to partner with the private sector.  Unlike the colossal changes made based 
upon recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, integrating the private sector into 
daily operations is, to this point, only spoken about—a “good idea.”  Touchstone is a 
groundbreaking project that puts ideas into action.  Significantly, a lesson learned from 
the Touchstone group in Washington, D.C. is there are enormous advantages to 
partnering with the private sector.  For example, during an arrest of a Washington Field 
Office terrorism subject, a Washington, D.C. Touchstone member provided assistance by 
offering the use of their company’s property as the arrest location.  This allowed agents to 
operate in a relatively safe and controlled environment that proved to be especially 
helpful in executing their plan. 
Another challenge to the project is managing the unintended consequences of its 
creation.  For instance, initiatives such as InfraGard may lose their zeal and membership 
may drop.  To mitigate this, InfraGard should enhance Touchstone.  InfraGard sessions 
should be tailored to provide training/guest speakers specifically addressing today’s 
                                                 
197 Best, Intelligence Issues for Congress, 13. 
 83
threat—as briefed during Touchstone meetings.  Members of InfraGard should be 
encouraged to participate in these training sessions in order to be better postured to 
become the “eyes and ears” on the ground.  Therefore, another unintended consequence 
may ultimately be that InfraGard members will further augment law enforcement through 
both a top down and bottom up participation.  Touchstone members, at the 
corporate/global security strata will provide information and guidance from their vantage 
point while the grassroots will be trained and keen to watch for nefarious activities which 
will then be reported up the chain.  This non-linear thinking198 will result in full 
integration, continuous information flow, bi-directional interaction and feedback. 
F. TOUCHSTONE EXECUTES THE “PREVENTION” PRONG 
The FBI’s Threat Mitigation Strategy (TMS) for Homegrown Violent Extremists 
(HVEs) is outlined in four steps: Detect; Penetrate; Disrupt and Prevent (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
198 Non-linear thinking has been defined as, “Human thought characterized by expansion in multiple 
directions, rather than in one direction, and based on the concept that there are multiple starting points from 
which one can apply logic to problem.  Non-linear thinking is less constrictive—letting the creative side of 
you run rampant because of its inherent lack of structure.”  “Do we think differently? Linear vs. Non-
Linear Thinking,” Chuck’s Lamp [blog] April 11, 2009, http://chuckslamp.com/index.php/2009/04/11/non-
linearthinking/ (accessed July 7, 2012). 
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Figure 2.   The FBI’s Threat Mitigation Strategy for Homegrown Violent Extremists 
Each piece of the strategy coalesces with the rest, with the prevention tine 
permeating throughout.  The FBI uses traditional investigative methods to address the 
Detect, Penetrate and Disrupt categories of the strategy.  However, the Prevention piece 
is not as well forged because it steps outside of established investigative techniques.  As 
Figure 2 depicts, prevention entails stopping people from becoming radicalized.  But, 
how?  The standard answer to prevention is outreach.   
Touchstone answers this call.  Not only does Touchstone represent outreach to the 
private sector, it moves a step further by identifying, engaging with and training the first 
line of defense—the private sector security apparatus.  Undoubtedly, the front line 
security guards, parking attendants, janitorial staff, or even every day citizens are the tip 
of the spear.  They are closest to the threat and will be the first to respond—certainly 
more so than the police and definitely more than the FBI (see Figure 2).  Giving the 
private sector the information necessary to understand and react to threats, real or 
perceived, better postures all involved detecting, penetrating and ultimately disrupting.  
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For example, in May, 2010, it was not the police who first noticed an unattended, 
smoking SUV parked in the heart of Times Square, New York City.  Rather, it was an 
alert street vendor who first identified that something was amiss and subsequently alerted 
police to the Nissan Pathfinder Faisal Shahzad attempted to ignite during his failed 
bombing in Times Square.  To further illustrate, a perceptive ambulance crew observed 
smoke coming from a Mercedes parked in front of Tiger Tiger nightclub in London.  The 
crew immediately notified police.  As reported by the BBC, “A controlled explosion was 
carried out on the car, packed with 60 litres [sic] of petrol, gas cylinders and nails.”  It is 
believed up to 1,700 people were inside the club during the time.  Had it not been for the 
observation skills of the ambulance crew, the results could have been devastating had the 
car exploded as intended.199 
G. THE ADVANTAGES OUTWEIGH ALL ELSE 
The ability to harness the full capabilities of key private sector stakeholders by 
making them full cohorts offers tremendous benefits.  For one, the wide array of 
collection capabilities among the private sector is sorely underestimated.  Many senior 
level security executives within the private sector are former law enforcement or 
intelligence community members.  This alone provides the ability to “speak the same 
language” when it comes to providing and understanding threat information.  
Additionally, inherent sector security assets can provide suspicious activity reports to law 
enforcement.  These reports may result in the identification of pre-operational planning, 
for example, that could ultimately lead to the disruption of nefarious activity. 
Moreover, private sector personnel are not only the first line of defense but also 
first responders.  In today’s threat environment, it is highly conceivable that nefarious 
pre-operational activities, such as hostile surveillance, will be discovered by private 
sector security personnel before anyone else in either law enforcement or the intelligence 
community.  With the advent of the individually inspired jihadist, it is less likely 
traditional intelligence community reporting will highlight a person’s radical tendencies.  
                                                 
199 “Police Avert Car Bomb ‘Carnage;’ A Car Bomb Planted in Central London Would Have Caused 
‘Carnage’ If It Had Exploded, Police Say,” BBC News, June 29, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6252276.stm (accessed April 21, 2012). 
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Rather, the shopping mall or hotel security guard will be the first to notice pre-
operational reconnaissance conducted by a person or vehicle they know to be out of the 
ordinary.  Without open lines of communication, training in detecting key indicators, 
actionable intelligence and the security reaction, thereafter the identification of possible 
lone actors or even homegrown violent extremist cells, will likely be missed.  Therefore, 
the private sector should be employed as an early warning system as well as an 
enhancement to law enforcement’s response to a terrorist attack or other event. 
The private sector is aligned such that it offers tremendous interconnectivity 
within its own ranks.  By design, the private sector’s architecture crosses multiple 
commercial facilities and sectors allowing for rapid outreach, information sharing and 
response to alerts, events or otherwise.  For law enforcement, this extraordinary ability to 
“light up” a network is extremely helpful in instances during which it is imperative 
information is distributed quickly and to as wide of an audience as possible.  This acts as 
a force multiplier in support of mission objectives such as threat information or “Be on 
the Look Out” alerts.   
Access to private sector assets and staff are benefits that should not be 
understated.  According to a United States Government Accountability Office Report to 
Congressional Requestors dated October 2006, “Because approximately 85 percent of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, developing trusted 
partnerships between the federal government and the private sector across all sectors is 
critical to ensure the protection of these assets….”200   
Beyond the percentage of critical infrastructure owned by the private sector that is 
quantified as “substantial,” according to the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, as of May 2011, the civilian labor force participation rate is approximately 
64.2% which includes workers age 16 and older.”201  By virtue of their sheer size alone, 
the private sector provides law enforcement with access to countless people, places and 
                                                 
200 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection Coordination Issues (GAO-
07-39), (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2006), 29. 
201 United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Databases, Tables and Calculators 
by Subject,” n.d. http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000 (accessed July 17, 2012).  
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things.  Moreover, the FBI has everything to gain by empowering the masses of the 
workforce to act as the “eyes and ears” for law enforcement.  “Working together the 
public and private sectors are stronger than either is alone.”202   
To illustrate, tapping into the private sector opens the door to information about 
staff, who may be suspects and/or potential sources of information.  It also affords law 
enforcement the opportunity to access a plethora of resources inherent to the private 
sector, such as CCTV coverage and subsequent captured and archived footage.  All of 
these provide invaluable support to operations whether they are overt or covert in nature.  
The vast majority of CCTV coverage is owned and operated by the private sector.  The 
importance of this asset should not be understated.  Access to historical and real-time 
footage is critical to supporting investigations and ultimately saving lives both “left and 
right of boom.”203 
Lastly, integrating the security apparatus of the private sector eliminates the gap.  
Securing the homeland is no longer a single agency-led mission.  The multitude and 
volume of threats facing the U.S. requires a collaborative effort by government and non-
government partners.  According to the NIAC: 
This collaborative responsibility is best accomplished through a 
collaboration that leverages the respective capabilities of government and 
the private sector: the government provides intelligence about potential 
threats and mobilizes public resources for protection, response and 
recovery, and the informed private sector uses this information to 
effectively manage risks and operate infrastructures in the face of such 
threats.204  
H. BUILDING THE TEAM—THE GOVERNMENT SIDE OF THE HOUSE 
A field office SAC should head his or her respective Touchstone group.  This 
SAC should be well versed in the current terrorism threat picture—both nationally and 
internationally.  This knowledge will prove to be paramount for providing context to 
                                                 
202 “NYPD Shield.”  
203 The phrase “left of boom/right of boom” is demonstrative of activities pre-blast and post-blast.  
The phrase is often used by Paul Smith, adjunct professor at Center for Homeland Defense and Security. 
204 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Critical Infrastructure, 4. 
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otherwise innocuous or uninformative news releases and bulletins.  The SAC may wish to 
have another manager act as a second chair.  In the case of the Washington, D.C. 
Touchstone group, a counterterrorism Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) works alongside 
the SAC.  Their collective duties include setting agendas, documenting endeavors, 
accumulating releasable intelligence bulletins and other pertinent information as well as 
maintaining liaison with all of the involved partners. 
The DHS’s Protective Security Advisors (PSA) for the field office’s AOR must 
be part of Touchstone.  As described by the DHS, “The PSA are trained critical 
infrastructure protection and vulnerability mitigation subject matter experts.”  PSAs “also 
conduct specialized site visits and provide information and guidance on critical 
infrastructure issues” as well as “conduct briefings and outreach meetings with critical 
infrastructure protection partners, help private sector personnel obtain security 
clearances [emphasis added], and disseminate critical infrastructure-related information 
such as protective measures reports.”205   
DHS’s ability to facilitate the acquisition of security clearances is an extremely 
important factor as well as asset to Touchstone.  While Touchstone strives to operate in 
the unclassified environment solely, there may be rare occasions when it is necessary to 
disseminate classified information.  Knowing that Touchstone members have been vetted 
via the clearance process also raises government officials’ comfort level regarding 
sharing information that may be on the fringes of being classified.  This becomes even 
more significant when consideration is given to the intrusiveness of the clearance 
process, not to mention the time and associated cost.  The Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) “which conducts over 90% of all federal security clearance 
investigations, conducts these investigations on a fee-for-service basis” estimated that, 
“based on the number and type of each investigation, the weighted average cost is about  
 
                                                 
205 “Protective Security Advisors,” n.d., http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1265310793722.shtm 
(accessed July 22, 2012).  
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$1230 per investigation.”206  While there are no specific figures detailing the price of the 
investigation, adjudication, processing and handling, Figure 3 shows estimates of fiscal 
year 2011 OPM clearance prices: 
 
INVESTIGATION PRIORITY HANDLING STANDARD SERVICE 
NACLC --------- $228 
SSBI $4,399 $4,005 
SSBI-PR $2,964 $2,711 
PPR $2,261 $2,009 
(NACLC) = National Agency Checks with Law and Credit  
(SSBI) = Single Scope Background Investigation 
(SSBI-PR) = SSBI Periodic Reinvestigations 
(PRP) = Phased Periodic Reinvestigations*207  
Figure 3.   FY2011 Prices of OPM Investigations 
Beyond clearances, advice and the expertise the PSAs bring to the table, they also 
come with an arsenal of training packages that are tailored to the private sector.  DHS 
training programs include, among others, Soft Target Awareness, Protective Measures 
and a Private Sector Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop.208  Finally, the PSAs also 
bring with them geo-spatial mapping resources (described in more detail in Let’s Chat: 
Information Sharing within Touchstone).  In sum, including the DHS as part of 
Touchstone unifies the U.S. government critical infrastructure efforts, each partner 
providing the private sector with their own unique expertise and resources. 
                                                 
206 William Henderson, “How Much Does It Really Cost to Get a Security Clearance?” August 7, 
2011, http://www.clearancejobs.com/cleared-news/381/how-much-does-it-really-cost-to-get-a-security-
clearance (accessed August 22, 2012). 
207 Henderson, “How Much Does It Really Cost?” 
208 “Bombing Prevention Training, n.d., http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1265223119415.shtm 
(accessed July 21, 2012).   
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I. BEYOND THE GOVERNMENT—FINDING YOUR JOE209 
Identifying private sector partners to participate in Touchstone may seem to be a 
daunting part of the endeavor.  Following a few simple steps will help eliminate the 
angst.  First, SACs should seek out a small group of executive-level owners and operators 
within the private sector security apparatus.  Touchstone members have to be decision 
makers—the bosses.  Within this stratum, singling out one’s private sector partners will 
be based, in large part, on each field office’s market.   
Membership will obviously differ from city to city and field office to field office.  
“…there isn’t one size that fits all” when it comes to building a Touchstone group. 210  
Each Touchstone group should remain as small yet as inclusive as possible.  Part of the 
appeal of Touchstone is each member is hand selected.  Being chosen and asked to 
participate creates an environment of trust and confidence versus more ad hoc and all 
inclusive groups such as InfraGard where most anyone can join.  Developing personal 
trusted relationships is paramount to Touchstone’s success.  Moreover, Touchstone 
membership is exclusive and limited to one chief participant and an alternate.  This 
stabilizes continuity and helps in the development of personal, trusted relationships. 
Membership criteria used to identify primary and alternate D.C. Touchstone 
members included the following: 
 DSAC members 
 Represent high profile/iconic ownership/management 
 Represent a large market position within a “key resource” service such as 
security, parking operator, major real estate and major hospitality 
 Has an effective network wherein each is able to very quickly “get the 
word out” within their own industry network 
                                                 
209 This is a reference to Joseph B. Donovan, Senior Vice President, Beacon Capital Partners who 
chairs the Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) national preparedness committee, is Co-
Chair of the Real Estate Roundtable, Homeland Security Taskforce, Co-Chairs the Commercial Facilities 
Sector Coordinating Council (CFSCC), is a Co-Chair of the NIAC Study Group and is unequivocally a key 
member of the D.C. Touchstone group. 
210 Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation (2nd ed. and Kindle edition), 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2004), 18. 
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 Confidence in each individual’s ability to work and cooperate with other 
Touchstone members in a non-competitive manner 
 Each has an existing security clearance or can and will obtain a security 
clearance 
To further allay some fears, current D.C. Touchstone members will assist other 
SACs by identifying counterparts and colleagues throughout the different market cities.  
Within the Washington, D.C. Touchstone, the private sector partners are largely 
comprised of commercial facilities owners and operators.  More specifically, the directors 
of security for the J.W. Marriott and Hilton Hotels are members of Washington, D.C.’s 
Touchstone as these two hotel chains represent the majority of the lodging subsector 
within the greater D.C. metropolitan area.  In addition to the hotels (Lodging) mentioned 
above, the D.C. Touchstone group is comprised of the following sector and subsector 
groups:  Public Assembly, Retail, Office, Security, Parking, Associations, Education, 
Finance and Government. 
J. LET US CHAT: INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN TOUCHSTONE 
All meetings should start with a current threat briefing.  Simply putting the threat 
into context is extremely helpful for the private sector.  For example, the FBI and DHS 
released a Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) regarding the 10-year anniversary of the 
attacks on September 11, 2001.  In the bulletin under the heading of “Key Findings” the 
bulletin stated:  
We have no indication [emphasis added] that al-Qa‘ida, its affiliates, or 
its allies are plottingHomeland attacks to coincide with the 10-year 
anniversary of 9/11.   
As of February 2010 al-Qa‘ida was contemplating large attacks in the 
Homeland on symbolic dates, to include the 10-year anniversary of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, but we have no specific, credible information 
[emphasis added] to indicate al-Qa‘ida’s aspirations have evolved into an 
active Homeland plot. 
Although we have not detected plots by HVEs targeting the 





motivated by al-Qa‘ida propaganda that increasingly encourages them to 
act independently—could try to stage an attack with little or no 
warning.211 
To the uninformed, this announcement appears as if there is nothing to worry 
about.  The U.S. government just said it has no information to indicate an attack is going 
to occur.  So, a head of security with a very tight budget and often times limited 
personnel may say there is no need to have extra guards on staff; or, there is no reason to 
enact more thorough identification checks.  This reaction could not be farther from ideal.   
Instead, Touchstone is the place where the “real story” should be told.  What 
needs to be relayed to the private sector is yes, in fact, there is no articulated threat; but 
that does not mean we should not be extra alert for nefarious activity.  It should be 
explained that al-Qa’ida has been planning attacks on the homeland continuously since 
the successful 9/11 attacks.  Al-Qa’ida believes in symbolic dates and, if possible, will 
seize upon any opportunity to conduct an attack on such a day.  Indeed, al-Qa’ida leader 
and mastermind Usama bin Laden’s death could be a catalyst for an attack.  Therefore, 
even though there is no specific information, it is recommended that private sector 
security be hyper-vigilant to anything out of the ordinary and report it to law enforcement 
immediately.  Touchstone briefings add to as well as reinforce a bulletin’s message by 
stressing the extreme importance of symbolic dates coupled with world events (i.e., in 
this example the death of bin Laden).  This allows private sector security to take 
necessary precautions to harden their targets.  
Another example involves an April 2012 Roll Call Release,212 which discussed 
terrorists’ interest in attacking theaters.  The document highlighted two particular 
incidents specific to movie theaters—one involving an al-Shabaab female suicide bomber 
                                                 
211 Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security, “Ten-Year Anniversary of 
9/11 Attacks: No Specific Threats, but a Potentially Attractive Terrorist Target” Joint Intelligence Bulletin, 
August 10, 2011. 
212 A Roll Call Release is a dual seal, FBI and DHS, bulletin often times distributed in conjunction 
with Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) meant to inform state, local, tribal 
and federal law enforcement and the private sector about terrorism-related information. 
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who detonated explosives at the national theater in Mogadishu, Somalia.213  The other 
example was of an al-Qa’ida linked extremist who suggested recreating attacks similar to 
the siege at the school in Russia as well as to engage in hostile take-overs of crowded 
places such as U.S. schools and movie theaters.214  The impetus behind the bulletin was 
to bring to light the potential for terrorist attacks against U.S. theaters.   
The Roll Call that was eventually drafted was very vague and provided only a few 
very general tips regarding potential indicators of an attack.  Some of the discussion 
points included being on the look-out for suspicious or illegally parked vehicles, looking 
for persons or groups trying to gain unauthorized entry to the theater or restricted areas 
and watching for unattended packages.  Conspicuously missing were specific 
considerations for theater owners and law enforcement.  Had context been given to the 
announcement, perhaps the July 2012 tragedy at the movie theater in Aurora, Colorado 
could have been minimized. 
In fact, recommendations were made with the intention of enhancing the 
bulletin’s content.  Some of the suggestions included: confirming all sensitive areas 
within the facility are properly secured and access is limited; confirm all CCTV and 
video systems are maintained, operating properly and are leveraged against perceived 
weak points and confirm emergency plans are current and up to date.  These are a mere 
sampling of the 19 total recommendations made to augment this bulletin—instead, the 
released bulletin was extremely generic and offered no direction or guidance.215  In the 
absence of informative, timely and actionable intelligence information, the private sector 
is left in a void to fend for itself. Touchstone fills that void.  Touchstone is beyond 
“crying wolf.”  Instead, Touchstone is a vehicle by which information is shared.  
Touchstone helps to provide the private sector with the “how does this affect me” spin.  
                                                 
213 Lee Ferran, Bazi Kanani, and Dana Hughes, “Theater Explosion Kills Several in Mogadishu,” ABC 
News, April 4, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-shabaab-claims-theater-explosion-kills-
mogadishu/story?id=16070499 (accessed August 22, 2012). 
214 Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report 2 104 0256 12, April 17, 2012. 
215 Department of Homeland Security and private sector entities, “Roll Call Release” (internal 
document draft) April 2012.  
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In fact, not only Roll Call Releases but Intelligence Bulletins are excellent pieces 
of information to discuss during Touchstone meetings—especially because many of them 
are also releasable to the private sector.  Additionally, special topics can be discussed.  
For example, during Washington, D.C. Touchstone meetings, briefings on the London 
Olympics, the Mumbai attacks and HVEs have been conducted.  Plus, Touchstone 
members should play a role in setting agenda topics.  Notwithstanding, regardless of the 
topic, the key to Touchstone is information sharing through open and honest dialogue. 
Now that what to talk about has been identified, how will this information be 
controlled?  Each Touchstone member within the Washington, D.C. group agreed to and 
signed a non-disclosure agreement.  Simply, the agreement affirms each person’s 
adherence to strict information protocols.  This moves beyond the informality of a 
“gentleman’s handshake” and formalizes the arrangement.  The execution of this 
document encourages trust and confidentiality among all involved. 
In lieu of sit down meetings, which may occur bi-monthly as determined by the 
respective Touchstone chapter, Touchstone should utilize existing technology to 
encourage continuous information sharing.  For example, within the D.C. Touchstone, 
emails and conference calls are routinely used to distribute timely and pertinent 
information.  Nurturing robust and relevant information sharing via meetings, emails and 
telephone conference calls encourages continued participation by members. 
In order to distribute information quickly, conference calls have been used in 
Washington, D.C.  During the calls, which are intended to last no more than 10 or 15 
minutes, important, timely and actionable information is disseminated to Touchstone 
partners.  For example, recently a conference call was convened in D.C. to discuss the 
security implications surrounding a major Jewish event that was anticipated to attract 
nearly 90,000 participants in the Northeast.  This was a significant event inasmuch as al-
Qa’ida routinely disparages the U.S.’s support for Israel and would most certainly attack 
such an event if the opportunity presented itself.  The conference call was organized so 
that Touchstone members would have visibility into the event, understand its significance 
and enact whatever security posture deemed necessary to secure their assets.   
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K. TOUCHSTONE OPERATES ON MULTIPLE LEVELS 
Unlike other outreach initiatives, Touchstone functions at the local/neighborhood 
plane of interaction.  As described in more detail below, Touchstone groups morph into 
neighborhood-specific outreach committees designed to engage with not only affected 
executive level security directors but also their regional, local and on-site managers and 
personnel.  It is at this level where local police and municipalities plug into the 
Touchstone project. 
By delving into specific neighborhoods, security conscientiousness is not only 
enhanced but conducted geographically versus sector specific.  As outlined in an earlier 
example, dealing with one security manager who is responsible for only three floors of a 
multi-story, multi-tenant office building is insufficient.  Instead, fostering a sense of 
collective security based on geographic location and proximity better serves 
neighborhoods at risk.  Touchstone’s involvement at the grassroots promotes the 
importance of constructive, non-competitive dialogue between private sector owners and 
operator at the most basic level and helps to foster a sense of community versus 
individualism.  
L. LOOK TO THE SKIES 
Touchstone is about developing a sustainable business process for timely, 
actionable, on-going and bi-directional intelligence information sharing between 
government and key private sector stakeholders to better address today’s threat 
environment.  Identifying vulnerable neighborhoods within an FBI field office’s area of 
responsibility through the use of geo-spatial mapping is a great way of integrating 
neighborhood partners.   
The DHS has the capability to assist with geo-spatial mapping through their: 
Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI), a subset of the Enterprise Architecture, 
[which] consists of geographic information systems software and 
hardware, geospatial applications, data, standards, policies, programs, and 
the human resources necessary to acquire, process, analyze, store, 
maintain, distribute and otherwise use geospatial data as a strategic asset 
for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) and the 
nation….  Completing and maintaining an SDI with integrated 
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applications and systems will provide the level of geospatial preparedness 
required to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure, strategic assets, the 
economic base, and America’s citizens.216 
Each field office Special Agent in Charge in conjunction with their DHS PSA 
should start by mapping their area of responsibility (AOR) using a grid system to 
delineate manageable regions (see Figure 4).  Figure 4 pictures Northern Virginia, 
Washington, D.C. and Prince George’s County, Maryland.  This region has been further 
divided into subsections approximately 3 x 1.5 miles in size.  In total, the described area 
was subdivided into 49 distinct boxes and individually labeled.  Each grid space was 
given an alpha designator starting with “A,” which was used to name boxes progressing 
from west to east.  Furthermore, each box was then numbered, starting with “1” moving 
north to south.  Simply, the grid letters/numbers are a naming convention used for easy 
identification of a particular mapped space. 
 
Figure 4.   Geospatial Mapping of Greater Washington, D.C.  
                                                 
216 Department of Homeland Security, “Management Directive System MD Number 4030,” November 12, 
2004, http://search.dhs.gov/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&affiliate=dhs&query=geospatial (accessed July 20, 
2012). 
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Once on a grid, significant sector and subsector assets should be identified.  For 
example, within the Washington, D.C. Touchstone group the subsectors listed in Table 2 
were plotted.  
Table 2.   Relevant Sub-Sectors 
Entertainment/Media Gaming 
Lodging Outdoor Events 
Public Assembly Real Estate 
Retail Sports Leagues 
Next, likely targets should be added to identify cluster points.  For example, 
public transportation hubs (Metro train stops in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area) 
military/Department of Defense presence and facilities, the presence of Jewish 
establishments, high concentrations of government agencies and/or contractors, and other 
at risk locations, as identified by each SAC, within a respective AOR must be identified 
and mapped (see Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5.   Geospatial Mapping: Critical Neighborhoods 
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As Figure 5 shows, within grid D5 four significant cluster points or 
neighborhoods materialized.  Each of these neighborhoods, A through D, represents 
collections of potentially exposed assets.  Furthermore, using a modified version of 
DHS’s Level I and II Tiering model for critical infrastructure,217 each region should be 
ranked as a Tier 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3 in priority—Tier 1 representing the biggest 
conglomeration of vulnerabilities while 3 is the least.   
To further assist in the prioritization process, daytime and nighttime density 
mapping should be employed (see Figures 6 and 7).   
 
Figure 6.   Daytime Density Layer 
                                                 
217 “The DHS Tier 1 and Tier 2 Program identifies nationally significant critical assets and systems in 
order to enhance decision making related to CIKR protection. CIKR identified through the program include 
those that, if destroyed or disrupted, could cause some combination of significant casualties, major 
economic losses, or widespread and long-term disruptions to national well-being and governance capacity.”  
Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 41. 
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Figure 7.   Nightime Density Layer 
As depicted, within the D.C. area, neighborhoods A through D are most at risk 
during the daytime as that is when they are the busiest and most populated.  Conversely, 
the threat to these areas drops significantly during the night.  This information is 
extremely helpful for scenario building (table top exercises) and resource deployment.   
Identification of vulnerable neighborhoods lends itself to conducting table top 
exercises.  Table top exercises are an excellent way of moving through a scenario in a 
very non-threatening relaxed manner.  Engaging in exercises helps identify strengths and 
weaknesses and, most importantly, encouraging interaction and better communication 
between neighbors.  As highlighted in Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 
“Rather than a ‘tool’ scenario-based planning is a paradigmatic way of strategic thinking 
that acknowledges uncertainty with all the consequences this entails.”218 
                                                 
218 van der Heijden, Scenarios, 18. 
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The Washington, D.C. Touchstone group has spearheaded neighborhood table top 
exercises within three of its four identified high susceptibility areas (as depicted in 
Figures 4–7).  The session objectives were to:  
 Educate both the private sector personnel as well as the government as to 
standard operating procedures, capabilities, responses, etc. of both entities; 
and  
 Raise awareness levels among both.   
Participants were challenged to meet their own organizational objectives, to learn 
to think in new and different ways and to understand the capabilities of all involved.  
Each participant was expected (and sometimes forced) to participate with the 
understanding that operating in an unfamiliar and challenging environment is not easy.  
The exercise promoted thought-provoking questions and responses as if the scenario were 
actually taking place.  Both private sector and government response protocols were 
discussed and reviewed for overall effectiveness.  Areas of potential weakness or 
ineffectiveness were identified so they could be revamped and improved. 
Throughout the course of the exercises, it was discovered that not only did 
neighbors not know each other, they were certainly not talking to one another about 
anything—the least of which was threats, suspicious activities or anything else that may 
have affected more than what was inside of their own four walls.  Interestingly, using 
table top exercises as a tool to challenge neighborhoods teased-out this little known and 
alarming fact.  Overwhelmingly, feedback from the exercises proved crucial in 
encouraging neighborhood collaboration and cohesiveness in the future.   
Significantly, the exercises should not end with the identification of weaknesses 
and potential vulnerabilities.  Rather, red cell exercises can be administered.  According 
to the U.K. based Red Cell Security Company, “Red Cell training was created after 
identifying the need for businesses and organisations to continuously test and exercise 
their Incident Management Plans and assigned management teams.”219  Using red cells, 
vulnerabilities, weaknesses, decision making, communication, policies and procedures 
                                                 
219 “Red Cell: Training and Exercises,” n.d., http://www.redcellsecurity.co.uk/detail_page.php?ID=3 
(accessed August 10, 2012).  
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can be tested during one afternoon.  Evaluating a staff’s response to a simulated event is 
an excellent way to fix problems prior to a crisis.  
A red cell exercise involves an independent team, often not affiliated with the 
target company, used to test an organization’s effectiveness.  Red cells, often referred to 
as red teams, provide an adversarial point of view and test the target establishment’s 
responses, policies and procedures—or whatever is deemed a potential weakness by the 
company’s management.  The thought is to identify vulnerabilities in a friendly, non-
threatening environment in order to make changes prior to a malicious penetration. 
For example, the D.C. Touchstone sponsored a table top exercise in the Pentagon 
City corridor (PCC) in northern Virginia.  This area is a hub of critical sectors and 
subsectors including real estate, retail, hotels, transportation, parking and restaurants.  
The PCC is minutes from the Pentagon, U.S. National Parks and Monuments and Reagan 
National Airport.  Amidst the PCC sits Pentagon City Mall, home to more than 170 
stores, a movie theater and restaurants.220  The mall is directly connected to the area’s 
mass transit metro-rail, commonly referred to as the “metro.”  Importantly, during the 
daytime, this corridor experiences a tremendous influx of tourists and boasts a visible 
military presence making it a viable and symbolic target. 
After the table top exercise, the Vice President, Corporate Security and 
Emergency Management for the mall’s owner, Simon Properties,221 agreed to put his 
security staff to the test.  The decision to partake in the exercise was made at the 
executive level so as to not alert any staff to the exercise.  A scenario is being built during 
which a small group of questionable characters will participate in suspicious activities 
while on the mall grounds.  The staff’s response and adherence to protocols will be 
assessed.  The results will determine the staff’s preparedness should a true event 
transpire.  Red cells are an excellent way to identify positives and negatives in a 
controlled, non-threatening environment. 
                                                 
220 “Simon Malls,” n.d., http://www.simon.com/mall/?id=157 (accessed June 22, 2012).  
221 Referenced Vice President is a member of the D.C. Touchstone group. 
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M. TOUCHSTONE IS WORKING 
The Washington, D.C. Touchstone project is extremely successful.  The group has 
been meeting for over a year.  Neither membership nor attendance has diminished.  In 
fact, new participants have been identified and added to the D.C. group.  These new 
members have added value without making the size of the group unmanageable and 
cumbersome.  Significantly, Touchstone is being deployed to several cities, including 
Detroit, Newark, Indianapolis and Jacksonville.  This growth is an example of crossing 
the chasm as Touchstone moves from its birthplace and spreads to other parts of the 
country. 
The Touchstone Project exemplifies breaking expectations and venturing into 
uncharted territory.  It is “restructuring information sharing in order to gain value.”222  
The true value and success of Touchstone is yet to be determined; but, so far Touchstone 
is very well received among both the private sector and government alike. 
N. SUMMARY 
Touchstone executes the Prevention Prong of the FBI’s Threat Mitigation 
Strategy for combatting homegrown violent extremists.  It is an exportable model hinged 
upon the integration of the private sector in securing the homeland.  The FBI, in 
partnership with the DHS, will lead the group from the government side of the house.  
Touchtone membership should be comprised of a small, hand-selected group of 
executive-level managers—decision makers—representing the field office’s major 
markets.  While each Touchstone will look a little different, the concept is the same—
building trusted, personal relationships with the private sector in order to most effectively 
counter today’s emerging threats.   
Information sharing, developing two-way dialogue and providing context to 
today’s threat information are the cornerstones of Touchstone’s mission.  Topics of 
discussion during Touchstone interactions can range from reviewing Intelligence 
Bulletins, Roll Call Releases, discussing events happening in and around the field office’s 
                                                 
222 Luke Williams, “Disruptive Thinking: Think the Unthinkable to Spark Transformation in Your 
Business,” n.d., http://www.disruptive-thinking.com/ (accessed July 12, 2012). 
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area of responsibility or even areas of concern as denoted by Touchstone members.  
Touchstone groups should meet in person and use conference calls for the rapid 
dissemination of timely information. 
Identifying a Touchstone group and vulnerable neighborhoods should be an 
evolving process enhanced by geo-spatial mapping.  Because Touchstone operates on 
multiple levels, regional and local, table top exercise are an excellent way of identifying 
and teasing-out potentially at risk neighborhoods.  Pinpointing vulnerable neighborhoods 
at the grassroots level allows for collective security because it is now geographic versus 
sector specific.  A follow-up to table top exercises are red cell exercises.  Red teams 
utilize an adversarial vantage point and are designed to test a region by highlighting 
positives and negatives in a controlled, non-threatening environment.   
In short, Touchstone is a multi-faceted outreach program that goes beyond the 
“handshake and a smile” posture which so often characterizes outreach.  Touchstone is 
easily replicated, sustainable and a necessary evolution to creating a whole of community 
approach to securing our nation.   
This collaborative responsibility is best accomplished through a 
collaboration that leverages the respective capabilities of government and 
the private sector:  the government provides intelligence about potential 
threats and mobilizes public resources for protection, response and 
recovery, and the informed private sector uses this information to 
effectively manage risks and operate infrastructures in the face of such 
threats.223 
Securing the homeland is no longer a single agency-led mission.  The multitude 
and volume of threats facing the U.S. requires a collaborative effort by government and 
non-government partners.  As the threat continues to evolve, so must the government’s 
response. 
  
                                                 
223 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Critical Infrastructure, 4. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
A. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Threats to the U.S. homeland and interests abroad are alive and well.  The death 
of bin Laden has not dissuaded radical Islamist extremists’ desire to attack the West and 
Western interests.  Moreover, a few tactical successes—specifically targeted drone strikes 
and other military actions—do not equate to strategic victory.  Indeed, the threat from 
transnational terrorism remains a chief concern for homeland security authorities.  
However, the threats from homegrown violent extremists, lone offenders and domestic 
terrorists have become more concerning over the years.  Alarmingly, the Arab Spring 
throughout the Middle East has sparked unrest throughout the region—this turbulence 
has resulted in an uptick of violence and anti-American rhetoric.  Moreover, the world is 
increasingly connected by virtue of the Internet and other forms of social media.  The 
Internet in particular has become the medium through which extremists export their 
recruitment, radicalization and proselytizing activities.  As the threats become more 
disparate, disjointed and diverse, so must our counterterrorism tactics.   
Neither legislation nor good ideas have manifested themselves in a sustainable 
business model for the integration of the private sector into the homeland security fold.  
Touchstone fills the gap and cements the private sector as permanent partners in the fight.  
Touchstone accomplishes this task through the development of personal, trusted 
relationships with a small, manageable group of executive-level security managers; 
through the timely dissemination of tailored, actionable intelligence information and by 
fostering an environment of bi-directional dialogue and feedback.  Touchstone goes 
beyond the gentleman’s handshake and recognizes the need to share versus the need to 
know.   
This innovative project breaks down barriers and strives to operate at both the 
regional and neighborhood levels.  At the neighborhood level, Touchstone takes on a 
geographic approach to countering today’s threat and invites communities of businesses 
and key stakeholders to thwart dangers as a neighborhood.  This horizontal methodology 
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of countering threats is very different from most other outreach programs which tend to 
focus on sectors.  During neighborhood table top exercises Touchstone integrates affected 
targets, their unwitting neighbors and the local police to discuss threat mitigation plans 
and encourage communication.  Touchstone has been underway in the greater 
Washington, D.C. Metropolitan area for about 16 months and is extremely successful.  It 
is so efficacious, Touchstone is due to deploy to Newark, Jersey City, Atlantic City, 
Detroit, Jacksonville, Indianapolis and Los Angeles.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. A Touchstone Group should be Established within All 56 of the FBI’s 
Field Offices 
Touchstone is an innovative sea change way of thinking for the FBI and 
government as a whole.  In partnership with the DHS, Touchstone fully integrates the 
private sector into the homeland security fold by regularly sharing timely, actionable 
intelligence information to key private sector stakeholders.  Touchstone’s cornerstone is 
trust.  Members share security concerns and viable solutions in a non-competitive 
environment.  Additionally, Touchstone partners are executive level and, therefore, 
decision makers.  Significantly, unlike other outreach programs Touchstone operates at 
both the regional and neighborhood levels.  Within the neighborhood stratum the project 
identifies and exercises information sharing through table top exercises.  Notably, 
Touchstone emphasizes a geographic approach to security at the neighborhood level.  
This approach ensures all involved, and seemingly uninvolved, businesses are aware of 
current and emerging threats in addition to the best way to thwart them as an entire 
community.  Furthermore, identified gaps and vulnerabilities are tested and re-tested 
through the use of red cell training.  Within an FBI field offices’ area of responsibility, 
Touchstone spearheads and facilitates cooperation and coordination at all levels.  Lastly, 
Touchstone fills the void where other outreach programs have fallen short.  It is popular, 
it is necessary and it is working as has been demonstrated by the success of the D.C. 
Touchstone group. 
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2. A National Business Registry should be Developed in Conjunction 
with Touchstone Groups Nationwide   
The national business registry will serve as a repository of private sector security 
points of contact for use by the FBI and, in some cases, other law enforcement personnel.  
Undoubtedly, this catalogue will be primarily comprised of Touchstone members from 
groups across the country.  This storehouse will serve to reduce confusion and increase 
the efficiency with which the private sector assists authorities.  Because the index is 
largely made up of trusted Touchstone partners, the FBI can feel confident these contacts 
are already trusted and vetted.  Moreover, the members are in positions to make 
immediate decisions, take necessary actions—perhaps at the behest of the FBI—and 
quickly facilitate the needs of the FBI.  The directory should be maintained by each field 
office’s Touchstone SSA.  This SSA should act as the gate keeper, ensuring appropriate 
use and dissemination of private sector points of contact.       
3. Touchstone should be Integrated into the FBI’s DSAC Program for 
Nationwide Management  
Touchstone must have all encompassing oversight at an FBI headquarters level.  
DSAC is the appropriate place for this as its mission is to liaise with the private sector.  
Moreover, DSAC already has the infrastructure and has built the muscle-memory 
necessary to adopt Touchstone as a sub-program.  Likewise, DSAC reports to the FBI 
Director’s Office and, because of this, program management of Touchstone at this level 
within FBI headquarters will ensure continued FBI buy-in and support.   
4. The DSAC Analytical Cadre and Support Staff should be Greatly 
Increased   
To fully support the FBI’s Touchstone groups around the country, the DSAC 
infrastructure must be enhanced with full-time analysts.  Ideally, the analytical resources 
should mirror the private sector’s demarcation with at least one team per sector.  These 
analytical teams should author an intelligence product specifically tailored to the private 
sector.  The piece should mirror that of DSAC’s overseas Department of State 
counterpart.  It should provide timely, actionable and tailored information particularly 
geared toward the private sector’s security of their assets.  DSAC products should be 
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regularly disseminated to Touchstone members and further discussed during Touchstone 
meetings and bridge calls. 
5. DSAC Leadership Training should Incorporate a Leadership 
Exchange Program Much Like the British London First Docket   
Such a program will encourage communication among government and business 
leaders on a more personal level.  All will benefit from the exchange of ideas and the 
trusted relationships that develop.  In addition, incorporating another facet to the DSAC 
portfolio should prove to increase its popularity and effectiveness as a leading proponent 
of private sector integration. 
6. Infragard should Continue and Complement Touchstone in its 
Programing and Membership   
InfraGard should incorporate a training curriculum similar to the U.K.’s Projects 
Griffin and Argus.  InfraGard should incorporate in person and on-line refreshers in order 
to ensure consistency throughout the private security mid and lower-level security 
professionals.  Accrediting the training programs, like the U.K.’s programs, will 
contribute to their importance and necessity within the security industry. 
7. A Counterterrorism Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Must Attend 
All Touchstone Meetings and Related Events   
The permanent attendance of an FBI Supervisory Special Agent will ensure 
continuity of the program.  Furthermore, it will demonstrate the FBI’s commitment to the 
program.  Additionally, this SSA should act as the main point of contact for all 
Touchstone members’ concerns and requests.  Finally, this SSA should work with the 
Touchstone members to develop meeting agendas and table top exercises within 
identified neighborhoods. 
To most comprehensively address existing and emerging threats facing the nation, 
the private sector must be integrated into the homeland security enterprise.  Touchstone is 
a necessary evolution and plausible solution to the current gap in our security enterprise.  
The D.C. Touchstone project joins private sector security executives with the FBI and 
DHS wherein trusted relationships are developed and nurtured, timely and actionable 
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intelligence information is disseminated, ideas are exchanged in a non-competitive 
environment and, most importantly, all know, understand and want to protect all aspects 
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